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The design and implementation of development programs is driven by a set of 
assumptions on development interventions that typically overlook the role of context; 
particularly social norms and institutions. Moreover, evaluation is still focused in 
understanding if an intervention works, instead on how to make it work better. This 
dissertation discusses the evaluation of a marketing intervention in Pakistan, and the 
evaluation of a participatory development strategy in Peru. Neither intervention produced 
the expected results. Rather than stopping there, I discuss the reasons behind their lack of 
effectiveness, specifically looking at elements for program re-design. 
The first essay discusses the randomized evaluation of a marketing intervention in 
Pakistan. The hypothesis was that given the positive role models featured in brochures 
promoting a microfinance product, women would increase their demand for loans. The 
brochure, however, had a negative effect in program take up among the poorest women.  
The likely reason behind this: prevailing social norms regarding role of women. 
The second essay stresses that the randomized evaluation experiment should not be taken 
as indicating that marketing is ineffective to improve the impact of microfinance in rural 
Pakistan, and that the role of social norms in microfinance can be internalized and used in 
the re-design of the brochure along several dimensions. Using theory of change and 
realistic evaluation approaches, I propose a framework that combines formative and 
process evaluation to design and pilot alternative marketing intervention in Pakistan. 
The third essay features the evaluation of the participatory strategy of El Alto, in Peru. 
This was a study with very limited data and virtually no control of the research team over 
the intervention. A mix of quantitative and qualitative techniques is used for outcome and 
intervention evaluation, and the framework presented on the second essay is used to 
understand why the participatory strategy has not been successful in sustaining 
participation. Originally an evaluation of small pretensions, it was used as an opportunity 
to revisit the objectives of the strategy, improve intervention design, and establishing a 
monitoring system based on administrative data. A case is made for complementary, 
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In development practice, it is not uncommon to observe technically sound and 
evidence-backed interventions underperform in terms of development results in a given 
context, even with negative unintended consequences. Over the years, I have been 
looking for a better understanding of the factors- internal and external to programs- that 
improve the probability of achieving desired development outcomes. Hence my 
professional interest in evaluation. 
This dissertation is based in projects I have been working on for the past few 
years: the evaluation of microfinance programs in Pakistan, the assessment of 
participatory development strategies at the municipal level in Peru, and the evaluation 
framework for different projects at the World Bank South Asia Region. None of the 
essays that comprise this work is a traditional self-contained academic paper with a 
standard hypothesis, framework and discussion of results. Two of them in particular tell 
the story behind specific interventions designed as part of two very common strategies in 
development: access to finance for the poor, and participation to identify local priorities 
and demands. The evaluation of these interventions was pursued with very different 
methods and in very different settings: a randomized control trial (RCT) in rural Pakistan 
with significant budget and significant control of the research team over implementation; 
and a mixed methods evaluation in a small district in Peru with virtually no control of the 
evaluator over implementation. The other essay proposes a framework to understand and 
internalize those elements around a development program that an evaluation normally 
tries to control for; and use that information for the design of alternative interventions.   
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The role of social norms and views of entrepreneurship in the success of 
microfinance programs in Pakistan  
Microfinance is arguably one of the most researched and scrutinized development 
interventions around the world. As much has been said about its potential for bringing 
households out of poverty as has been discussed about its shortcomings. In fact, a recent 
debate on the effectiveness of microfinance in South Asia focused on the promises of 
microfinance proponents, with calls from academic and NGO quarters to stop over-
claiming its potential benefits, and to better understand the context in which microfinance 
is implemented, together with the incentives of borrowers and lenders (Banerjee et al., 
2009; Karlan and Mulainathan, 2010).  
Assessing those claims has increasingly relied on impact evaluations. In 
particular, RCTs have been used to evaluate variations and add-ons to microfinance 
programs: from access to credit itself to business training or insurance mechanisms; and 
their effects on a number of outcomes: from loan uptake, to income generation, to 
empowerment and intra-household gender relations.  
This paper discusses the effect of a marketing experiment in rural Pakistan on 
loan take up and loan size, in which two different versions of a brochure informing of a 
new large loan program were randomly assigned among microcredit clients organized in 
credit groups. One brochure design showed five businesses managed by men; the other 
design showed the exact same businesses but managed by women.  
The hypothesis of the experiment was that given the positive role models featured 
in the brochures, women would increase their demand for loans under the large loan 
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program. An increase in loans take up by women was of particular interest to the 
microfinance organization, given the prevalent low demand for loans of women in 
microfinance schemes. As the essay explains, the results of the randomized evaluation 
were puzzling at first, but a more detailed look at context surrounding participant villages 
provided the key for understanding the results. This had consequences not only for the 
marketing experiment, but for the larger experiment it was embedded in, focused in the 
theoretical debate between “Money or Business skills” as constraints to entrepreneurship. 
The findings of the marketing experiment in fact cast serious doubts on the most 
fundamental assumptions behind the focus on access to credit and business skills in the 
microfinance literature.  
Institutions and social norms when evaluating development interventions: A 
framework and lessons from the Pakistan case study 
While the marketing experiment generated information that is relevant and 
academically interesting; I contend first that the results could have been foreseen with a 
closer look at context in rural Pakistan that informed a better design of the brochures 
used, or of the way they were introduced. 
I emphasize that the conclusion of the marketing experiment is not that marketing 
does not work in rural Pakistan to increase women’s participation in microfinance. The 
experiment was based on a particular brochure design based on experience elsewhere, 
and what the brochure promoted was not microfinance in general, but a particular 
program offering larger than normal loans.  
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In fact, the overall microfinance program was designed along the lines of a 
theoretical debate and strong assumptions on the demand and supply of credit in rural 
Pakistan, with little attention paid to context at the time of design. The evaluation, while 
using a ‘gold standard’ like RCT, provides limited assistance in informing intervention 
adaptation, in part because the RCT was strictly used to only determine attribution, 
without looking much at the future of the program. This is a reflection of the emphasis in 
evaluation as a point of arrival instead of a point of departure, and its lack of integration 
with design and implementation. 
The proposed framework, drawing from the most recent literature on realistic 
evaluation, experimentation, and experiential learning, offers a systematic look at the 
institutional settings (formal and informal) surrounding program implementation, and 
how they affect the behaviors that a program looks to trigger in the target population. It 
then shows steps to build alternative intervention designs tested through formative and 
implementation evaluation even before a full-fledged impact evaluation is deployed. I 
argue that such approach provides for results that are more policy-oriented in a more 
cost-effective manner.  
The essay is an explicit call to subordinate and adapt the evaluation method to the 
development problem at hand and the complexity of the context faced; but also to better 
connect evaluation to implementation by testing alternative intervention designs (or 




We built it, they came. Now what? Participatory Strategies in Municipalities of 
Peru: The Case of El Alto, Piura  
The effectiveness of participatory development programs has been the focus of 
another of the recent debates in the development literature. Much has been discussed on 
the expected results of participation along the lines of improving service delivery and 
fostering a sense of empowerment among citizens; as well as disappointment surrounding 
participation in light of elite capture, little reflection of citizen views in service delivery, 
and limited impact on development outcomes. In fact, most impact evaluations around 
this topic seem to find rather limited impact of participation on human development 
indicators.  
Instead of concluding that participation does not work, I argue that 
underachievement in participatory programs is linked to: 
- A disconnect between the rationale for participation and the concrete program 
actions and objectives set for it. 
- Implementation problems consequence of an intervention design that ignores 
context and institutional settings. 
- A focus on the demand side of participation, instead of a strategy complemented 
with supply-side interventions. 
 To illustrate this, I discuss an evaluation I had the opportunity to lead in El Alto, 
Peru. The original scope of the evaluation requested by the municipal government was 
very limited, with number of people attending neighborhood meetings the core indicator 
of success. The essay tells the story of how the research team was able to turn a 
retrospective evaluation with very limited data into an opportunity to assist the 
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Municipality of El Alto in redesigning the strategy and its monitoring system.  Adapting 
the framework proposed in the previous essay, the research team showed the Mayor of El 
Alto and his team that the limited results achieved so far are likely unsustainable without 
complementing the current strategy in key areas. Thus, the recommendations include 
changes to the design of El Alto’s participatory strategy with interventions adapted to 
context, and a restructured monitoring system of its participatory program based on the 
systematization of information already available.    
The challenges faced during the evaluation are taken not as limitations to the 
analysis, but as valuable information about the internal processes of the implementing 
agency (the local Municipality) and of the political context, and how these affected 
implementation, vis-à-vis what was originally planned. As a matter of fact, the mixed-
methods evaluation of objectives and implementation reaches different conclusions 
depending of the time frame used in the analysis, based on political events in El Alto..   
I conclude that the participatory strategy of this small city in the north of Peru, 
while creating a mechanism for closer interaction between local government and citizens 
in times of political upheaval, lacks response mechanisms to deal with a growing flow of 
demands and concerns from citizens, something that compromises the overall strategy 
and its sustainability. 
The strategy evaluation identifies key elements along the participatory process 
that need to be reinforced in order to strengthen the short term outcomes pursued by the 
Municipality, but also to increase the likelihood of realizing the instrumental and intrinsic 
values of participation that are the focus of the academic debate.  
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Taken together, the essays point how the introduction of widely accepted 
development strategies such as microfinance and participation, even with the support of 
international organizations or local authorities, fail to fulfill the expectations they 
generate due to the little attention paid to local context at the time of design and 
implementation. Recent reviews of microfinance programs (Banerjee, Karlan and 
Zinman, 2015) and participatory programs (Mansuri and Rao, 2013) reveal a lack of 
evidence of their transformative effects.  However, instead of stopping at reporting 
effects, evaluation can and should be used to strengthen intervention design and 
implementation. The framework herein presented hopes to be a contribution to the 













Essay One: The role of social norms and views of entrepreneurship in the success of 
microfinance programs in Pakistan1 
“Microcredit and other ways to help tiny businesses have an important role to play in the 
lives of the poor, […] but we are kidding ourselves if we think these businesses can pave 
the way for a mass exit from poverty”  
Banerjee and Duflo, 2011 
 
I. Introduction 
The first essay of this dissertation tells the story of an experiment designed only 
as a complement to a larger microfinance study and examining more closely gender-
specific constraints to entrepreneurship in rural Pakistan. This evaluation shows how 
development interventions that are transposed to a new place without major consideration 
of local context, or those designed purely on an academic debate, can result in 
disappointing outcomes and conclusions with limited policy potential. 
Microfinance is arguably one of the most researched development interventions. 
It is strongly rooted in economic theory: in fact, the debate on the effectiveness of 
microfinance programs to get people out of poverty is centered in two main arguments 
that have their origins several decades back.  
Schumpeter (1942), Baumol (1968) and Solow (1975) were among the first to 
highlight the role of entrepreneurship in growth and economic development. The 
                                                           
1 The field experiment that this analysis is based on took place in the November 2006- December 2008 period with all 
data (including repayment outcomes) available by late 2009. The author oversaw the analysis of all the proceedings 
from the field and co-authored one of two peer reviewed papers from the data: Gine and Mansuri (2014) and Gine, 
Mansuri and Picon (2012). I thank the Development Research Group of The World Bank and my co-authors Xavier 
Gine and Ghazala Mansuri for allowing the use of the data related to this field experiment. All views expressed are 




literature of microfinance often refers to their work when making a case for this type of 
programs: if entrepreneurship is the key to development, the constraints to 
entrepreneurship in developing countries must be identified and removed.  
One constraint in the literature is access to finance.   Distortions in capital markets 
have been argued as affecting business creation and survival from Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1984) to more recently de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) or Banerjee et 
al. (2010). Microfinance practitioners, including the pioneer of microfinance and founder 
of the Grameen Bank, Muhammed Yunus,   justify microfinance under the premise that 
“giving the poor access to credit allows them to immediately put in practice the skills 
they already know” (Yunus, 1999). 
However, there is another strand of literature, building around the occupational 
choice models of Lucas (1978) that focuses on the role of business skills (called more 
generally managerial capital) as key for economic development. Research by Van Reenen 
(2010), Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar (2010) and Schoar (2010) specifically focuses on the 
role of business skills in reducing restrictions to entrepreneurship in microfinance 
programs.  
How exactly do business skills and access to credit generate economic 
development as part of a microfinance program? The literature around microfinance is in 
fact very rich in terms of intermediate development outcomes that can be achieved 
through such programs, from individual-level (such as empowerment, use of time, 
outlook of life), to household-level outcomes (income, expenditures, assets, educational 
attainment of children) and business-specific outcomes (sales, business creation or 
business practices and knowledge). Further, the claims of the potential benefits of 
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microfinance are so wide-ranging that they have triggered a debate on their accuracy (see 
Duvendack et al. 2011 for a systematic review). In South Asia, there have been calls from 
academic and NGO quarters to stop over-claiming microfinance’s potential benefits, and 
to better understand the context in which microfinance is implemented, together with the 
incentives of borrowers and lenders (see Banerjee et al., 2009; Karlan and Mulainathan, 
2010). 
In short, the many theories surrounding microfinance are in general appealing, at 
times well justified with references to classical economic theory as previously discussed 
and in  other cases, heavily relying on anecdotal evidence or practical experience. 
However, even when microfinance is found to have average positive and significant 
effects, it is worth asking not only which of these many pursued outcomes are being 
achieved, but also for whom does microfinance seem to be working, and why.   
In restricting the debate to access to credit and business skills, microfinance 
programs implicitly assume that individuals in credit groups2 (commonly referred as self-
help groups) are entrepreneurs-in-waiting, or in the case of those already owing a 
business, eager to expand their operations. It may well be the case for some; however, for 
others, starting or scaling-up a business or operation is not an aspiration given the size of 
the market around the entrepreneur. In addition, fear of not being able to repay the loan 
prevents some households from participating in the program3.  
                                                           
2 Microfinance organizations typically use group-lending practices: they lend to groups of members 
instead of individuals to seize economies of scale, reducing the costs  the costs associated with monitoring 
loans and enforcing repayment  The loan to one participant in group-lending typically depends upon the 
successful repayment from another member, thus transferring repayment responsibility off of microcredit 
institutions to loan recipient. 




Field et al. (2010) was among the first known publications to dig into the 
possibility of a ‘third constraint’ to entrepreneurship in microfinance programs, one that 
particularly affects women. Their research in rural India indicates that even when credit is 
available, women’s demand for it can be low because of social norms and traditional 
institutions that limit their mobility and participation in economic life. With limited 
business opportunities for them, it makes less sense to take up loans, and when they take 
one, it is a small one on average.  
Context of the Marketing Experiment 
The overall research design  that generated the data for this study was focused in 
providing evidence on the ‘Money or Business skills’ debate in rural Pakistan, in 
coordination with NRSP, the second largest microfinance organization in Pakistan. The 
evaluation design assumed interest of participants in becoming entrepreneurs or 
expanding their business, since all participants were members of credit groups for some 
time. The initial analysis of the expansion of credit and business training provided by the 
program over a wide range of proposed outcomes indicated virtually no effects across the 
board for women, a result that admittedly puzzled the research team4. 
Alternative hypotheses for why women failed to realize the benefits of 
microfinance were widely discussed among the team.5 The key insights, however, came 
from a side-experiment that had been added to the original plan in 2006, inspired by the 
literature on behavioral change through marketing. This essay describes the result of this 
marketing experiment and how it relates to the larger study.  
                                                           
4 See Appendix 1 for a summary of results from the “Money or Business Skills” experiment. 
5 Note that at the time of this initial analysis of the data, Field et al. (2010) was not yet published. Most 
alternative hypotheses explored at the time were focused on why female-led businesses were of lesser 
quality or profitability, particularly focused in the educational and use of time links, and using 
occupational choice models (Lucas, 1978; Emran, Morshed and Stiglitz, 2007) as a theoretical foundation. 
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To promote a loan product that offered the opportunity of borrowing up to four 
times the size of a regular loan, a marketing tool was designed to stimulate participation, 
particularly from women. In coordination with the microfinance institution, two different 
brochures provided information about the characteristics of the program and described 
the application process. The brochures were identical, except for the cover page: one 
featured 5 different businesses with men operating them, while the other had the exact 
same five businesses, but with women entrepreneurs. Groups of borrowers invited to 
participate in the loan program were randomized to receive either the brochure with the 
female or the male pictures.  
The impact of marketing on individual or group behavior has been well-
documented (see, for example, La Ferrara et al., 2008; Jensen and Oster, 2007 and 
Paluck, 2009). However, the relationship between social marketing and microfinance has 
not been very much explored, with Bertrand et al. (2010) the immediate precedent. They 
analyzed a direct mail field experiment among microfinance clients in urban South Africa 
that randomized advertising content, loan price, and loan offer deadlines simultaneously; 
and found that advertising influenced behavior (particularly among men) when the 
treatment appealed to intuition (such as with a picture) as opposed to reason (like a 
comparison of interest rates across lenders).   
Based on this precedent and the ‘affinity’ proposition (Evans, 1963; Mobius and 
Rosenblat, 2006), the hypothesis for the Pakistan study was that women would be more 
responsive to flyers showing women managing businesses, while men would be more 
responsive to flyers showing men managing the same businesses.  
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The results from the marketing experiment featured in this essay, however, show 
a rather different kind of affinity. I argue that the results reflect social norms regarding 
women’s role in society and the household, which in turn affect take up of the loan 
product. Thus, the negative effect of female brochures among women business owners 
with low decision making power in the household, is likely mirroring the reaction to the 
female brochure of the male household head.  This is consistent with men’s observed low 
regard for females as business owners6 in Pakistan.  
The results of this marketing experiment provided key information to the larger 
“Money or Business Skills” study. In that experiment, decision making in the household 
was one of the many outcome indicators explored; after the marketing experiment 
analysis, decision making  became a key stratification variable for that analysis.   
The microcredit movement that has developed in past couple of decades is 
eminently woman-centered,  because it is widely accepted that women may be the ones 
most in need of credit , and the ones in the household that are likely to invest more of the 
proceedings of the business in their household. In Pakistan, however, microfinance has 
focused primarily on men, precisely because the restrictions to women’s involvement in 
economic activity are known. One of the justifications of the overall microfinance 
program was increasing women take up of microfinance loans, particularly among the 
poorest households. This objective was not achieved.   
In the case of the brochures, while well rooted in theory of providing information 
and positive role models, they failed to consider in their design the low decision-making 
power of their female members, a reality that was widely known before the experiment 
                                                           
6 Beaman et al. (2009) discuss the issue of male attitudes toward women participation in non-traditional roles for the 
case of perceptions about female politicians. 
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started among NRSP field workers and practitioners in Pakistan.  Among the 
recommendations of this essay, it is argued that other interventions, especially targeted to 
women (or to men) may need to be tested, such as campaigns to change stereotypes or 
specific incentives that stimulate not only take up, but that actually improve more 
structural or societal outcomes for female entrepreneurs, generating a signal or 
demonstration effect that challenges the prevailing stereotypes of gender roles.  
The rest of the essay is structured as follows. Section II describes the context in 
Pakistan and the field experiment. Section III discusses the data and Section IV describes 
the empirical strategy and the results of the experiment. Section V concludes with some 
recommendations and lessons from the research process that can be useful for future 
work in Pakistan and elsewhere.  
II. Context and the Field Experiment 
II.1. Access to Credit in Pakistan  
Over 60% of Pakistan’s 162 million population lives in rural areas. Even though 
agriculture remains the most important economic activity for people in rural areas of the 
country, about 45% of the rural poor also rely on non-farm activities as one of their 
income sources7.  
This rural population of Pakistan has quite limited access to financial services and 
credit, despite a significant growth of the country’s financial system and modernization 
of its regulatory framework8. According to Nenova et al (2009) the financial system only 
                                                           
7 Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2009 and World Development Report 2008. 
8 Even considering urban and rural areas together, only 14 percent of households interviewed reported using a 
financial product or service (including savings, credit, insurance, payments, and remittance services) from a formal 
financial institution. When informal financial access is taken into account, however, this figure rises to just over 50 
percent. In comparison, 32 percent of the population has access to the formal financial system in Bangladesh, and this 




reaches 15% of farmers in Pakistan. Financial access is the lowest among the poor, 
women, and small and micro enterprises in rural areas, even though market studies 
consistently suggest they are viable customers. Overall, rural firms and households 
account for about 7% of total credit disbursement (about Rs 130.7 billion in 2008) and 
the bulk of this is for agricultural finance (Rs 108.7 billion the same year), including both 
farm and nonfarm credit (see Akhtar, 2008). While microcredit volumes are skewed 
towards rural areas, microcredit currently accounts for only 17% of total rural credit and 
serves some 1.7 million clients. Comparative rates of microfinance penetration in the 
South Asian region are 35% in Bangladesh, 25% in India, and 29% in Sri Lanka. Another 
key characteristic of the microfinance sector in Pakistan is that unlike most countries, it 
has focused primarily on men rather than women on the grounds that there is less demand 
for credit from women given their low mobility levels and gender segregation in labor 
markets.   
II.2     Description of the field experiment 
The field experiment was conducted in the districts of Bahawalpur, Hyderabad, 
and Attock, spanning different agro-climatic regions of Pakistan9. Figure 1 shows the 
location of the study districts. A baseline survey was conducted in November 2006 in a 
sample of 747 credit groups (COs), selected so that their membership was between 5 and 
26 members. The resulting sample consisted of a total of 4,161 members interviewed, and 
2,284 members (54.9%) that were in good standing (eligible for credit)10. The timeline of 
the experiments is presented in Figure 2. 
                                                           
9 The branches considered for the study are as follows: Matiari and Tando Muhammad Khan in Hyderabad, Attock in 
Attock and Bahawalpur in Bahawalpur. 
10 NRSP staff conducted a complete listing of the occupation of CO members in the study branches to identify those 
who were engaged in non-farm activities. The original sampling framework included all CO members that according to 
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Figure 1. Areas in Pakistan where research was undertaken (in blue) 
 
Source: National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) 
Figure 2. Timeline of the Experiment 
 
       Source: Author, based on field experiment information 
Using data from the member’s registry, COs were randomly allocated into two 
groups, one of which was assigned to receive business training. Training sessions were 
held, from February to May 2007, with each session lasting for 6 to 8 days. After 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the listing exercise had a non-farm business and five other members selected at random from each CO. In practice, 
however, enumerators ended up interviewing everyone that attended a special CO meeting that was called to 
conduct the baseline survey. 
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completing the business training sessions, members from all study COs were invited to an 
orientation meeting that introduced the possibility of borrowing a larger loan amount11. 
Orientations occurred successfully in 596 COs.12 During the orientation meeting, 
3,451 members who were in good standing (i.e., those who had successfully repaid at 
least one loan on time) received one of two versions of the marketing brochure. The 
brochure was identical in all respects except one. In one version, the entrepreneurs 
manning the businesses were male while in the other they were female. To ensure that 
only the gender of the businessperson differed between both versions of the brochure, the 
exact same business was photographed twice, the first time with a man as owner and the 
second with a woman. The businesses in the brochure were chosen to be representative of 
the type of businesses typically run by NRSP micro entrepreneurs.13 All members of a 
CO were given one of the two brochures, which were randomly allocated across COs. 
Randomized evaluation was the method of choice for the analysis as it reduces or can 
even eliminate selection bias in the results, increasing internal validity, and therefore, 
allows the results to be presented in terms of attribution (Duflo, Glennester and Kremer, 
2006). 
The goal of the brochure was to explain how to apply for a larger loan (for a 
picture of the brochure, see Appendix 2). According to this, all eligible members could 
                                                           
11 Most orientation sessions took place in regularly scheduled CO meetings and lasted for about an hour and a half. 
Attendance at these sessions was high, with more than 90 percent of members attending. Message consistency 
during the orientation was maintained by providing training to all NRSP credit officers and other staff who were in 
charge of delivering the orientations. There were 12 teams of two NRSP staff each in Attock, 29 in Bahawalpur and 7 
in Hyderabad. 
12 In the remaining 151 COs, orientation meetings could not be held because the CO had either disbanded or was 
newly formed so that none of its members were eligible for the experiment.  
13 The brochure thus contained two agribusinesses, two retail businesses and one tailoring business. According to 
baseline data, about 49% of male businesses were agribusiness, 27% were in retail and 9% were involved in 
handicrafts and tailoring, thus accounting for almost 85 percent of all male businesses. Among female businesses, 
20% were agribusinesses, 18% were retail businesses and 57% were in handicrafts and tailoring, accounting for 
almost 95 percent of all female businesses. 
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make a loan request of up to Rs. 100,000. The request was subject to all the usual 
technical and social reviews conducted by NRSP credit officers, who could also 
determine the loan amount they were willing to approve for each borrower. Approved 
loans which were larger than the usual limit of Rs. 30,000, were to be forwarded to 
headquarters, for final decision. 14  Although the brochure encouraged members to 
borrow for productive purposes, in practice there were no restrictions on the use of the 
loan15.  
Eligible CO members had seven months, from November 2007 to June 2008, to 
apply for the larger loan. Of the 2,284 eligible CO members, 713 (31%) applied. NRSP 
approved 532 loans (75% of applications). Most applicants had their loan amounts 
reduced; credit officers reported that this was due to concerns that borrowers would not 
be able to make the required monthly installments16.  
A follow-up survey was conducted in December 2008. This was six months after 
the loan lottery concluded and about 13 months after the loan orientation meetings. In the 
follow up, some 45% of eligible CO members recalled attending the loan lottery 
orientation meeting. Among those who recalled attendance, about 70% recalled receiving 
a brochure and of these about half were able to correctly recall the picture they were 
shown. 
                                                           
14 The final decision on lending the money to approved applicants depended on the result of a lottery held at NRSP 
headquarters to assign all eligible members as large loan lottery winners or losers. Lottery winners could borrow the 
approved amount, while those who lost the lottery could borrow up to their regular loan size. The lottery was 
designed so that the chance of winning was 50 percent. 
15 Qualifying members who already had an outstanding loan with NRSP were even allowed to apply for the larger 
loan, subject to the condition that part of the new loan would be used to pay off the outstanding debt. 
16 Of the customers approved, 254 were assigned to win the lottery (48%) and 211 ended up borrowing 
(83%). Among the 278 loan applicants not selected through the lottery, only 161 borrowed (58%). Among 
the reasons cited for changing their mind are that time elapsed from request to approval (average time 




II.3 Rationale of the intervention and theory of change 
The design of the microfinance experiments was well anchored in recent 
microfinance literature on business skills, access to finance, and the use of marketing  to 
affect behavior through positive role models (in this case, women leading local 
businesses). It did, however, rely on a number of assumptions on the nature and depth of 
the gaps addressed by the interventions17. 
The marketing experiment (Figure 3) was designed to encourage female uptake of 
the new microcredit product that allowed eligible borrowers to borrow larger amounts of 
money. This focus on female uptake is why the analysis is performed in terms of the 
effect of a female brochure vis-à-vis a male brochure. Alternatively, the combined effect 
of female brochure and business training is explored. In hindsight, it may well be possible 
that too much was asked from introducing the brochure: the featured positive role models 
were expected to be enough to overcome a context of low demand for credit from 
women; and a microfinance market such as the Pakistani, oriented to men instead of 
women. Instead of customizing microfinance products to women as a target group, it was 
assessed if information about the program highlighting positive models sufficed to 
increase take up and average loan size. Women (and the males in their households and 
communities) were expected to be more open to female entrepreneurship after the 
treatment was introduced. 
Figure 3. The Marketing Experiment’s Theory of Change 
                                                           
17 This section stresses the assumptions behind the design of the intervention and the field experiment 
itself. Its importance will be highlighted when discussing impact evaluation designs in the other two 




Source: Author’s conceptualization 
Two of the main outcomes of interest include applications for the larger loan 
program (take up) and the average size of loans requested. The analysis in this essay 
focuses on immediate impact in terms of demand for credit. However, the assumption 
behind the intervention is that larger take up of the program will unchain the benefits of 
microfinance in terms of individual, household and business outcomes.   
 The “Money or Skills” experiment also relied on a few key assumptions. Strictly, 
the experiment did not compare the role of business knowledge to access to credit, but 
did so for access to larger loans used for opening a business or scaling up operations in an 
existing one. Some CO members had been microfinance clients since 2002, with different 
levels of credit demand over the 2002-2006 period (from 0 to 7 loans). Both business 
training and access to larger credit were expected to generate improvements in 
development outcomes, overcoming the same context described for the low demand for 
credit and prevailing social norms.   
III. Data 
NRSP Administrative data and data from baseline and follow up surveys are used 
for this analysis. In the case of the survey, a wide range of characteristics was collected as 
21 
 
baseline data in November 2006 with questions about the CO member, the member’s 
household, the business if they had one, and the CO. Household characteristics included 
information on expenditures, wealth (including agricultural land, livestock, housing 
quality and savings) and past and current debt and savings of household members. 
Business characteristics included age, location and type of business activity, as well as 
the scale of the business as measured by its assets, hired workers and monthly sales. The 
survey also contained information on CO cohesion, including borrowing and lending 
between members in a CO and the collective purchase and/or sale of products. Summary 
statistics from the baseline survey are presented in Table 1,18 and variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix 3.  
The average age among CO members in the sample is 38 years, with 4.1 years of 
average education. Households have average landholdings of 4.5 acres and monthly 
expenditures of Rs 5,200 (US$61). About 60% of the households in the sample run at 
least one business. This percentage is significantly higher than the population average in 
the study areas because households with businesses are more likely to be microfinance 
clients.19 Although most businesses have a fixed location and operate year round, the 
average scale is small. About 90% of businesses do not have a paid employee.  
Businesses managed by male and female CO members are quite different.  While 
women are primarily engaged in small home based manufacturing (handicrafts or 
tailoring), men are involved primarily in the agribusiness sector which requires much 
                                                           
18 Indexes are calculated on the total number of observations for each variable, this is why their overall 
mean is close to zero.  
19 According to the Demographic and Heath Survey conducted in 2006-07, 31 percent of households in 
rural areas reported having at least one household member engaged in non-agriculture self-employment. 




greater contact with markets outside the village The scale at which male and female 
businesses operate is quite different (see also de Mel et al. 2009): average monthly sales 
among male-led businesses are Rs 22,820 (USD 380) while only Rs 4,827 (USD 80) 
among businesses run by female CO members. Women tend to operate mainly from 
home and are less likely to employ paid employees. In addition, 40 percent of female CO 
members involved in a business at baseline claim that the main business decisions, such 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Entrepreneurs are also in fact different from other CO members. They are more 
likely to be older, more educated and to report a family history of business ownership. In 
addition, business owners have better digit span recall20, have a better outlook on life and 
not surprisingly, also score higher on a business knowledge test. They are also more 
likely to be risk tolerant.  Among women, those that have a business are less likely to 
report mobility constraints, but are somewhat more likely to observe purdah21, perhaps 
because they are relatively wealthier. 
 Women are also more likely than men to belong to a mixed gender CO in the 
sample (about 63 percent of members in mixed COs are women). While this is a small 
sample overall, given that only 7 percent of COs have both men and women, there are 
some indicative differences between women in mixed and single gender COs. In 
particular, the former seem to have less ‘voice’ in the COs they belong to. While the odds 
of holding office in the single gender COs are about the same for men and women, at 20 
and 18 percent respectively, 48 percent of men and only 7 percent of women in mixed 
COs report holding any office. Women in mixed COs are also significantly more likely to 
observe purdah ,even though mixed COs are more than twice as likely to be composed of 
                                                           
20 Individuals are asked to recall eight digits after 30 seconds. Evidence from enterprising psychometrics 
indicates that better digit span recall is linked to selection into entrepreneurship (Djankov et al. 2005). 
21 Purdah is the practice among women in certain Muslim and Hindu societies of living in a separate room 
or behind a curtain, or of dressing in all-enveloping clothes, in order to stay out of the sight of men or 
strangers. The practice varies in intensity across communities. What is common to the areas of the study 
is covering head and body, and restrictions to mobility. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Individual Characteristics
Age 82 1798 36.26 38.27 0.16 137 1434 34.06 37.85 0.00
Own Education 82 1798 7.22 5.22 0.06 137 1434 2.54 2.65 0.61
Business Owner (Yes=1) 82 1798 0.63 0.61 0.66 137 1434 0.59 0.58 0.84
Digit Span Recall 82 1798 3.87 3.85 0.94 137 1434 2.39 2.71 0.12
Risk Tolerance (0=Risk Averse; 10= Risk Lover) 82 1798 4.09 3.80 0.38 137 1434 2.80 3.43 0.02
Married (1=Yes) 82 1798 0.77 0.82 0.01 137 1434 0.83 0.85 0.48
Index of Optimism 82 1798 -0.23 -0.02 0.21 137 1434 -0.87 -0.29 0.00
Business Literacy 82 1798 0.97 0.66 0.07 137 1434 0.14 0.23 0.67
Index Female Mobility 82 1798 - - - 137 1434 0.08 0.00 0.36
Index No Purdah 82 1798 - - - 137 1434 -0.30 0.19 0.00
Trust in Formal System 82 1798 -0.01 -0.03 0.31 137 1434 -0.28 -0.14 0.00
Months as CO member 82 1798 16.48 28.74 0.00 137 1434 20.28 24.98 0.45
Holds office in CO (1=Yes) 82 1798 0.48 0.20 0.00 137 1434 0.06 0.18 0.01
Eligibility 82 1798 0.49 0.63 0.00 137 1434 0.53 0.63 0.00
Household Characteristics
Household size 82 1798 7.88 7.93 0.70 137 1434 7.45 7.00 0.00
Years of Education of  Spouse 82 1798 3.87 2.67 0.02 137 1434 4.93 4.88 0.91
Number of children under 9 82 1798 1.78 1.97 0.40 137 1434 1.69 1.40 0.05
Land 82 1798 4.38 6.01 0.39 137 1434 4.48 2.58 0.30
Fraction of CO Members of same Zaat (caste) 82 1798 0.41 0.43 0.12 137 1434 0.45 0.21 0.00
Ever in Business (1=Yes) 82 1798 0.60 0.62 0.11 137 1434 0.54 0.61 0.76
Log of Value of Livestock 82 1798 5.77 9.36 0.00 137 1434 6.99 4.78 0.00
Distance to meeting place 82 1798 6.24 7.50 0.07 137 1434 5.91 9.17 0.00
Credit Constraints (1=Yes) 82 1798 0.09 0.12 0.28 137 1434 0.19 0.16 0.31
Expenditures (1,000 Rupees) 82 1798 5.42 4.98 0.91 137 1434 4.86 4.58 0.36
Decision making 82 1798 3.10 3.35 0.71 137 1434 1.95 1.83 0.39


















Table 2. Baseline Member Characteristics of  Mixed vs single gender COs
P-val of       









Table 3 shows the main sources of credit for sample households at baseline. Only 
5 percent of members have any loans from formal financial sources, mainly commercial 
banks. In contrast, 34 percent report borrowing from informal lenders, mainly 
shopkeepers, and 21 percent report borrowing from relatives23. Average loans taken from 
an MFI is only Rs. 12,000 (around USD 140). There is little variation in the relative share 
of lenders by gender, however, though female CO members tend to borrow less overall.   
                                                           
22 Seclusion practices are much less stringent within zaat/biradari (caste) groups. See Jacoby and Mansuri 
(2011). 
23 Informal lenders also include traders and wholesalers and, to a smaller extent, professional 












Percent borrowing from [source] in 2006 5.07 83.43 33.77 21.12
Do not like to borrow 52.55 81.39 70.81 74.69
Inadequate collateral 18.50 1.98 11.94 6.77
Lender's procedures are too cumbersome 14.49 9.31 6.70 5.82
Lender's loan terms are unfavorable 5.48 0.59 3.35 0.91
Lender is too far away 3.18 0.40 0.78 1.35
Need to pay bribes 2.02 0.79 2.18 0.08
Past default with lender 1.96 0.79 0.89 1.15
CO members not willing to lend to me 1.25 4.55 2.51 6.53
Bad credit history 0.56 0.20 0.84 2.69
The main [reason] for not borrowing from [source]?
Credit Source
 
Source: Baseline Survey, 2006 
Table 3 also reports reasons for not borrowing for those who reported not using a 
credit source. Interestingly, most respondents without loans report not a lack of access, 
but an unwillingness to borrow – either because they have no need for loans or because 
they dislike borrowing – as the main reason for not taking a loan and this varies little 
across lenders. Lack of collateral and cumbersome loan application procedures come in 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 presents the means of baseline variables for the sample as a 
randomization check. The difference in means for members receiving the male and 
female brochure is significant for only two of the 16 baseline variables considered. Study 
participants who received the male brochure borrow more from informal sources and are 
less likely to be members of a mixed group (both significant at the 10% level) than 
members receiving the female brochure. For the sample of males, the difference in means 
in the two groups is again significant for only two of the 16 variables considered. Male 
participants who received the male brochure are somewhat less likely to belong to a 
mixed CO (significant at the 10% level)24 and are somewhat less likely to borrow from 
friends and relatives (significant at the 5% level). For the sample of females the 
difference is only significant for own education. Women who received the male brochure 
appear to have higher formal education by about one third of a year. Table 4 also reports 
the p-value of an F-test that all baseline characteristics are jointly insignificant. The 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in any of the three samples (lowest p-value is 0.58), which 
strengthens the argument of successful random assignment.  
IV. Empirical Approach 
Because the type of brochure is assigned randomly at the CO level, its impact can 
be estimated via the following regression equation: 
  Yij = α + βFBj + ɣXij + εij      (1) 
where Yij is the outcome of interest for individual i in CO j (e.g., and indicator variable 
that takes the value 1 if the respondent had applied for a larger loan, and 0 otherwise), 
FBj is an indicator variable that take the value 1 if the respondent was shown the female 
                                                           




brochure, Xij is a vector of individual characteristics collected at baseline and εij is a 
mean-zero error term. Standard errors are clustered at the CO level throughout since the 
CO level treatment assignment creates spatial correlation among members of the same 
CO (Moulton, 1986). 
The vector Xij includes the following baseline characteristics reported in Table 1: 
eligibility, being offered business training, a dummy if decision-making power is above 
the median in the same gender sample, own education, digit span recall, spouse 
education, landholdings, membership in a mixed group, age, number of children and risk 
tolerance. It also includes field unit (branch) dummies, which is the stratification variable 
in the model.  This set of variables includes characteristics showing imbalances in the 
randomization check as well as variables that are likely to affect the decision to borrow 25. 
Lastly, the coefficient β captures the impact of being shown a brochure with pictures of 
female entrepreneurs on the cover and is the coefficient of interest. 
 Interactions are also examined between the type of brochure shown and baseline 
characteristics which could proxy for attitudes towards women 
Yij = α + π(FBj * Zij)+βFBj + ɣXij  + εij    (2)   
 Zij is a subset of individual characteristics included in the vector Xij that could 
represent an individual’s attitudes towards women. The coefficient π on the interaction 
term FBj * Zij reveals the extent to which the impact of the female picture (FB) on loan 
uptake varies according to the members attitudes towards women.  
 
 
                                                           





Two main outcomes were explored for the marketing experiment: the decision to 
borrow and the loan amount requested. Table 5 presents regression results for the 
decision to borrow. Columns (1)-(3) present results for the full sample, combined and 
disaggregated by gender. On average, only 14.6 percent of members, roughly 31 percent 
of the eligible, applied for a larger loan. This is somewhat higher for men, at 20 percent, 
and correspondingly lower for women, among whom only 8 percent of the eligible 
applied.  Given that the sample consists of existing microfinance clients, this number 
appears low; when asked anecdotally, many borrowers report either that the monthly 
installment amount for the larger loan was too high or that the maturity period was too 
short. This indicates that NRSP clients are not, by and large, constrained by the current 
loan size, but that some could benefit from larger loans. Among men, older members and 
business owners are more likely to apply, while among women, being offered business 
training increases loan demand. In general, however, and after controlling for different 
characteristics, exposure to the female brochure does not seem to have any effect on loan 
take up.  
Columns (4)-(6) report on all CO members who had a business at baseline. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the female brochure impacts negatively the uptake by women 
entrepreneurs. The effect is not small: from a base of 8.3 percent, the point estimate 
indicates a reduction of 39 percent the probability of applying for the larger loan26.  
                                                           
26 In contrast, businessmen appear indifferent to the female picture in the brochure and, as before, being 
offered business training increases loan demand while membership in a mixed CO depresses it, but there 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The result among women appears counterintuitive:  if anything, one might expect 
that a woman who owns a business would be attracted to a loan product that makes 
salient her identity as a business woman. But since women operate businesses that are 
much smaller than those of men, it is possible that the negative impact is an artifact of the 
business scale. Specifically, women may find the scale of the business pictured in the 
brochure too large and they may be discouraged from applying27.  
To explore this hypothesis further, the sample is restricted to female business 
owners who operate at a scale comparable with men by sector28. Given differences in 
business scale by gender, this matched sample subsequently consists of businesses in the 
upper tail of the distribution of female businesses (and lower tail of distribution of male 
businesses). In particular, female businesses in the matched sample have on average Rs. 
4,016 higher sales compared to the sample of all female businesses, while male 
businesses in the matched sample have Rs. 8,129 lower sales than the average for all 
male businesses. Sample size is also considerably reduced. Only 363 female businesses 
can be matched with a corresponding male business. Columns (7)–(9) report these results. 
The coefficient for female brochure remains negative but loses precision: the coefficient 
falls by about 16 percent while the standard error increases by about 70 percent. In sum, a 
                                                           
27 There is some anecdotal evidence that businesswomen felt that some of the businesses featured in the 
brochure were run on a larger scale than the typical female business and that this fact discouraged them 
from borrowing. As mentioned, many women operated each of the three business types featured in the 
brochure, which together account for 95 percent of all businesses run by women. In addition, the 
brochure clearly stated that the loan could be used for any purpose and for any business, but 
nonetheless, the picture may have triggered a more deliberative response (see Kahneman, 2003 for a 
discussion on perception in decision-making). 
28 For each female business, the absolute difference in sales with each male business in the same sector is 
computed and then the business with the smallest difference is picked. A male business is matched only 
once with a female business. In the final sample only those female businesses where the absolute 




negative effect of exposure to the female brochure cannot conclusively be ruled out even 
among women business owners who run larger businesses. Note, however, that in this 
matched group, being offered business training increases the probability of a woman 
applying for a larger loan by 86 percent from a base of 11 percent and appears to be 
driving the overall increase in loan applications due to the offer of business training. On 
the other hand, decision making power29 does not appear to encourage loan applications 
from women in any of these samples. 
Table 6 reports the regression results from specification (2), for males (columns 
1-3) and females (columns 4-6) on all three samples. All regressions include the baseline 
controls used in Table 5. The first striking fact is that a subset of men respond to the 
psychological content of the brochure. Specifically, business owners with low scores on 
the digit span recall question, a proxy for ability, and those whose wives are poorly 
educated (p-value of FB x Years Education of Spouse is 0.11), respond negatively to the 
female brochure. In this group, loan demand falls by about 13 percentage points (more 
than a 50% decline over the base demand).   
While the experimental design does not allow a distinction between lack of 
affinity towards women and an outright distaste for female-run businesses as possible 
explanations for the negative response, it suggests one channel through which exposure 
to the female brochure among female business owners could depress loan demand. 
Specifically, women who have low decision making power may turn to their husbands for 
                                                           
29 The decision-making variable is built by taking the number of household decisions out of a list of eight 
that the member usually takes on his or her own. The decisions are: children’s schooling, consumption 
expenditures, major investments in business or land, the respondent’s participation in community or 
political activities, the respondent’s spouse participation in community or political activities, whether or 
not the respondent should work for an income, whether or not the spouse should work for an income and 
how much the household saves. In the analysis, a dummy is used that takes value 1 if the variable is above 
the median for each gender subsample. 
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permission to borrow and may face a negative response from them when shown the 
female brochure.   
The experiment provides evidence of this.  Among female business owners, only 
those with low decision making power in their household react negatively to the female 
brochure.  Interestingly, female business owners with high decision making autonomy 
shown the male brochure also react negatively by roughly the same magnitude, while 
there is no effect on female business owners with autonomy shown the female brochure 
(p-value is 0.28).30 This suggests that women with decision-making autonomy react 
negatively to the brochure of opposite sex by about as much as men without business, 
with low digit span and poorly educated wives. Given the disadvantaged position of 
women in rural Pakistan, it can be deducted that men may have less respect for female 
businesses whereas women may feel more alienated when shown the male brochure.  
In the matched sample (column 6), the results for female business owners with 






                                                           
30 The test is whether the coefficient on the female brochure plus the coefficient on decision-making 
power above median plus the coefficient on the interaction between the female brochure and decision-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female Brochure 0.088 0.085* 0.161*** -0.035 0.0036 -0.006 0.008 -0.098
(0.054) (0.049) (0.052) (0.104) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.069)
Offered Business Training -0.041 -0.032 -0.092 0.004 -0.01 0.007
(0.042) (0.046) (0.104) (0.029) (0.031) (0.068)
Female 0.078 -0.054
(0.079) (0.055)
Age 0.010 0.015* -0.007 0.010** 0.013** 0.002
(0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017)
Age 2̂ 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High Decision-making power (1=yes) 0.015*** 0.087*** 0.024 0.008* 0.021 0.1
(0.005) (0.028) (0.071) (0.005) (0.026) (0.064)
Own Education 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.016 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.016^
(0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010)
Digit Span Recall -0.012 -0.018** 0.024 -0.013** -0.012* -0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.024) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016)
Risk Tolerance 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Yrs. Of Education of Spouse 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.004 0.018**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Number of children under 9 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.017
(0.009) (0.009) (0.029) (0.006) (0.006) (0.022)
Business Owner (Yes=1) 0.023 -0.006 0.064 0.050 0.058 0.027
(0.032) (0.036) (0.069) (0.035) (0.042) (0.061)
Land 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Member of a Mixed CO/CG 0.096 0.377** -0.233 0.025 -0.06 0.076
(0.153) (0.170) (0.167) (0.176) (0.176) (0.197)
Mean Dependent Variable 10.93 10.93 10.92 10.97 10.67 10.67 10.72 10.52
N. Observations 664  664  491  173  503  503  372  131 
R-squared 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.34 0.26 0.44
Table 7A. Loan Size, All Members
OLS
Log of Amount Approved
All Members
Note: The dependent variable is log of loan amount requested (columns 1-4) and log of loan amount approved (columns 5-8). The sample 
includes loan applicants. All regressions include branch fixed effects and are estimated using OLS methods. Standard errors are clustered 
at the borrower group level.The following symbols *,  * * and ** * denote significance at the 10 , 5 , and 1 percent level, respectively. See 
Appendix B for definition of variables.
Log of Amount Requested
All Members
 
Table 7A reports the impact of the female brochure and baseline characteristics on 
the loan amount requested (columns 1-4) and approved (columns 5-8) among loan 
applicants. Table 7B reports the same regressions among loan applicants with a business 
at baseline. In both tables a positive and significant effect of the picture is found on the 
loan amount requested among males but not females. The result in both tables is driven 
primarily by selection because men without a business and low digit span recall tend to 




Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female Brochure 0.093 0.08 0.135** -0.061 0.027 0.011 0.002 -0.068
(0.057) (0.050) (0.052) (0.129) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.081)
Offered Business Training -0.032 -0.058 -0.021 0.054** 0.026 0.032
(0.046) (0.047) (0.145) (0.027) (0.026) (0.098)
Female 0.089 -0.094
(0.082) (0.064)
Age 0.013 0.017 -0.024 0.007 0.015** -0.006
(0.009) (0.011) (0.021) (0.005) (0.006) (0.023)
Age^2 -0.000* -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High Decision-making power (1=yes) 0.025 0.095** -0.022 0.029 -0.007 0.094
(0.038) (0.038) (0.091) (0.030) (0.024) (0.070)
Own Education 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.027 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Digit Span Recall -0.014 -0.019* 0.003 -0.009 -0.009 0.001
(0.011) (0.010) (0.034) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020)
Risk Tolerance 0.002 0.001 0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
Yrs. Of Education of Spouse 0.001 0.007 -0.007 0.002 -0.005 0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Number of children under 9 0.004 0.008 -0.032 0.001 -0.004 -0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.037) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019)
Business Owner (Yes=1)
Land 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005 0.002 0.000 0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Member of a Mixed CO/CG 0.138 0.314 -0.293 -0.007 -0.256*** 0.030
(0.167) (0.213) (0.293) (0.239) (0.086) (0.331)
Mean Dependent Variable 10.92 10.92 10.92 10.92 10.69 10.69 10.69 10.69
N. Observations 459 459 356 103 355 355 278 77
R-squared 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.58
Business Owners Business Owners
Note: The dependent variable is log of loan amount requested (columns 1-4) and log of loan amount approved (columns 5-8). 
The sample includes loan applicants. All regressions include branch fixed effects and are estimated using OLS methods. 
Standard errors are clustered at the borrower group level.The following symbols *,  * * and ** * denote significance at the 10 , 5 , 
and 1 percent level, respectively. See Appendix B for definition of variables.
Table 7B.  Loan Size, Business Owners
OLS




The results of the marketing experiment have several consequences for future 
work of NRSP and other microfinance organizations in rural Pakistan.  
VI.1 On the use of Marketing tools to increase demand among women 
The rationale behind using brochures to promote a new microfinance product in 
rural Pakistan was that information targeted to women would increase female take up 
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through affinity. It did not happen.  In a context of already low take up (especially of 
women, but also of men), the female brochure actually reduced take up among female 
business owners. This result is concentrated among women with low levels of numeracy 
(proxy for ability), relatively low levels of education, and limited decision-making in the 
household. In fact, results and the analysis that followed them suggest that the decision to 
not borrow money reflects the reaction of males in the household instead of that of 
women. This is deduced by a similar effect among men with low education levels and 
limited numeracy. In this way, the gender segregation in the labor market of Pakistan 
finds itself reflected in microfinance programs: women can be business owners, but men 
in the household are the ones making most of the decisions, including borrowing money.  
If the goal of NRSP is to increase female participation in microfinance, marketing 
tools need to be better designed and customized so they sensitize both women and men. 
The results in this sense confirm what Field et al. (2010) find for India on the importance 
of understanding traditional views and social norms about gender roles when assessing 
and designing microfinance programs.  
VI.2 On interpreting the results of the ‘Money or Skills’ experiment  
As previously mentioned, the field work was designed to inform the ‘Money or 
Skills’ debate. As part of the data collection process, information on decision making 
within the household was included in the baseline and follow up questionnaires. The idea 
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was to treat decision making as an outcome indicator, one that would serve as a proxy for 
female empowerment31. 
The analysis of the marketing experiment changed the role of this proxy in the 
analysis. The “Money or Skills” experiment indicated negligible effects of both 
interventions on development outcomes for women, despite a strong effect of business 
training on business knowledge among them. This suggests that barriers remain that 
constrain women from transforming business knowledge into profitable businesses and 
improved socio-economic indicators.   The marketing experiment generated information 
on the role of social norms that guided the rest of the analysis. Using information from 
use of time surveys and proxies for decision-making in the household helped reach a 
better understanding of the effects of both business skills and increased line of credit. As 
a consequence, it has also become clear that NRSP microcredit products need to be 
customized in such a way that they respond to social constraints faced by a significant 
number of CO members. 
VI.3 On the design of microfinance interventions  
It would be easy to conclude by arguing that the marketing experiment found that 
social norms governing women in society are in fact a key constraint to female 
entrepreneurship in Pakistan, in line with the observations of Field et al (2010) work in 
India. However, there were clear indications of this being the case before the field 
experiment was designed given the patterns of participation in previous NRSP programs, 
national trends in women’s access and demand for credit, and information from the 
                                                           
31 The complete analysis of the ‘Money or Skills’ experiment can be found in an upcoming paper by Gine 




baseline, such as use of time surveys and reasons for not borrowing. A more careful 
analysis of context previous to the experiment could have significantly altered the design 
of the marketing tools used, including the comparison between tools or the interaction 
between them. Instead, the only piece of actionable information for NRSP the experiment 
produced is that female brochures, as designed, fail to increase women’s take up of their 
microcredit products. This however, should not be taken as an indication that marketing 
does not work for microfinance in Pakistan. The conclusion reached is only valid for this 
specific tool, and a consequence of applying a standard intervention without adapting it to 




































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Intent to Treat Effect
Business Training (1=Yes) 0.058* -0.006 -0.001 -0.034 0.131** 0.043 -0.021
(0.031) (0.008) (0.012) (0.028) (0.062) (0.027) (0.054)
Lottery Winner (1=Yes) -0.014 -0.012 -0.007 -0.002 0.099 0.081** 0.013
(0.037) (0.013) (0.019) (0.036) (0.082) (0.035) (0.071)
BT and LW 0.075* -0.004 0.010 -0.014 0.166** 0.047 -0.080
(0.038) (0.013) (0.018) (0.037) (0.079) (0.035) (0.066)
R-Squared 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.33
P-value of t - test of ...
BT = BT and LW 0.63 0.88 0.51 0.55 0.61 0.89 0.32
LW = BT and LW 0.03 0.53 0.42 0.77 0.45 0.40 0.26
BT = LW 0.05 0.59 0.77 0.37 0.69 0.29 0.66
Panel B: Intent to Treat Effects with Gender Interactions
Business Training (1=Yes) 0.058 -0.011 -0.012 -0.061* 0.122 0.067* 0.023
(0.043) (0.013) (0.016) (0.037) (0.085) (0.036) (0.070)
BT x Female 0.000 0.013 0.023 0.060 0.018 -0.061 -0.111
(0.062) (0.017) (0.025) (0.055) (0.118) (0.052) (0.102)
Lottery Winner (1=Yes) 0.014 -0.019 -0.015 -0.004 0.061 0.095** -0.008
(0.045) (0.018) (0.024) (0.045) (0.105) (0.046) (0.092)
LW x Female -0.066 0.016 0.017 0.000 0.097 -0.034 0.065
(0.073) (0.023) (0.035) (0.068) (0.150) (0.067) (0.138)
BT and LW 0.066 -0.016 -0.017 -0.047 0.246** 0.084* -0.07
(0.051) (0.016) (0.020) (0.046) (0.102) (0.044) (0.085)
BT and LW x Female 0.021 0.028 0.062* 0.077 -0.225 -0.098 -0.022
(0.073) (0.024) (0.036) (0.069) (0.138) (0.069) (0.128)
R-Squared 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.34
BT = BT and LW 0.87 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.17 0.64 0.20
LW = BT and LW 0.46 0.50 0.92 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.32
BT = LW 0.35 0.63 0.90 0.20 0.55 0.54 0.76
BT + BT x Female = 0 0.19 0.88 0.56 0.98 0.10 0.88 0.26
LW + LW x Female = 0 0.38 0.85 0.94 0.34 0.18 0.22 0.58
BT and LW = BT and LW x Female = 0 0.12 0.53 0.14 0.58 0.84 0.79 0.35
Mean of dependent variable among controls 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.40 0.02 -0.09 0.47
N. Observations 3494 3494 3494 2137 1333 1311 1265
A.  Business Outcomes
Note: The reported mean of the dependent variable is computed using CO members not offered business training nor chosen as winners of the lottery.The dependent 
variables are aggregates of standardized z-scores. See Appendix B for a definition of the aggregates. All regressions are estimated using OLS methods and include as 
covariates the stratification variables (eligibility for loan lottery, business ownership at baseline, gender and branch dummies). Standard errors reported in parentheses 






Assets CO Cohesion Outlook on Life
Decision-
Making 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Intent to Treat Effect
Business Training (1=Yes) 0.070*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.082
(0.021) (0.027) (0.024) (0.080)
Lottery Winner (1=Yes) 0.036 0.037 0.074** -0.021
(0.027) (0.032) (0.029) (0.113)
BT and LW 0.069** 0.084** 0.115*** -0.027
(0.029) (0.039) (0.032) (0.116)
R-Squared 0.44 0.02 0.08 0.03
P-value of t - test of ...
BT = BT and LW 0.99 0.88 0.25 0.32
LW = BT and LW 0.30 0.28 0.22 0.97
BT = LW 0.25 0.14 0.79 0.38
Panel B: Intent to Treat Effects with Gender Interactions
Business Training (1=Yes) 0.094*** 0.102*** 0.050 0.123
(0.028) (0.039) (0.033) (0.123)
BT x Female -0.056 -0.031 0.067 -0.083
(0.041) (0.053) (0.047) (0.162)
Lottery Winner (1=Yes) 0.046 0.032 0.058 0.045
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.163)
LW x Female -0.02 0.012 0.032 -0.146
(0.050) (0.061) (0.054) (0.205)
BT and LW 0.144*** 0.145** 0.115*** -0.067
(0.038) (0.060) (0.040) (0.161)
BT and LW x Female -0.167*** -0.139** 0.000 0.096
(0.051) (0.068) (0.059) (0.207)
Decision-making power 0.46 0.50 0.08 0.00
P-value of t - test of ...
BT = BT and LW 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.20
LW = BT and LW 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.55
BT = LW 0.18 0.39 0.84 0.64
BT + BT x Female = 0 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.70
LW + LW x Female = 0 0.50 0.39 0.03 0.46
BT and LW = BT and LW x Female = 0 0.53 0.87 0.01 0.84
Mean of dependent variable among controls 0.01 -0.11 -0.12 0.12
N. Observations 3494 3494 3494 3494
Note: The reported mean of the dependent variable is computed using CO members not offered business training nor chosen as winners 
of the lottery.The dependent variables are aggregates of standardized z-scores. See Appendix B for a definition of the aggregates. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS methods and include as covariates the stratification variables (eligibility for loan lottery, business 
ownership at baseline and gender). Standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the CO level. The following symbols *,  * * 
and ** * denote significance at the 10 , 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.




























Data used in this paper come from two surveys:  a baseline conducted in November 2006, 
a follow-up survey in December 2008.  Administrative data about loan take-up, obtained 
from NRSP’s internal records, is also used. 
Treatments and Take Up (from administrative records) 
• Female picture brochure takes the value of 1 if the member was shown a 
brochure with female business owners on the cover, 0 if the brochure showed the 
same businesses with men. 
• Eligibility, takes the value of 1 if member is eligible for the loan lottery, 0 
otherwise.  
• Business Training, a dummy taking the value of 1 if the individual was offered 
business training, 0 otherwise. 
• Applied for larger loan, 1 if the member actually requested a loan, 0 otherwise.  
• Approved, conditional on applying for a loan, takes a value of 1 if the member 
was approved by NRSP, 0 otherwise. 
• Borrowed, takes a value of 1 if the individual actually borrowed money from 
NRSP; while conditional on approval, not all those that applied and were 
approved took actually a loan. 
• Amount borrowed, is measured in thousands of Rupees. 




• Female equals 1 for women and 0 for men. 
• Age is respondent’s age in years.   
• Years of education is years of completed schooling, and is top-coded at 16.   
• Married, a dummy taking the value of 1 if member is married, 0 if single, 
divorced or widowed. 
• Digital span recall reports the number of digits correctly recalled after being 
shown an eight digit number for 30 seconds. 
• Member of a mixed group, dummy takes the value of 1 if the member belongs to a 
borrowing group with mixed gender, 0 if the group is of the same gender. 
• Index of female mobility and No purdah index are principal components of several 
variables with negative values indicating less mobility (or observing more types 
of purdah). 
• Business owner equals 1 if the member had a business at baseline, 0 otherwise. 
• Aversion to risk general is measured on a 0-10 scale where 0 indicates the most 
risk averse and 10 the most risk-tolerant/lover. 
• Months as member, number of months as member of NRSP group. 
• Holds Office in Group, takes value 1 if member has or has had in the past a 
leadership position in group. 
• Fraction of Members of same Zaat (caste), is a percentage of members in the 
group that share the same cast of the member.   
Household 
• Education of spouse is years of completed schooling of the respondent’s partner, 
if any. Top coded at 16. 
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• Total HH income and Expenditures, transformed to logs for analysis. 
• Number of children under 9 
• Land is the total owned land inside and outside the village. 
• Credit constraints, dummy taking a value of 1 if the member faced any type of 
credit constraint, formal or informal. 
• Ever in business, captures business experience within the household. Equals 1 
when this is the case, 0 otherwise. 
• Decision Making, is the number of household decisions out of a total of eight that 
the member usually takes on his or her own. The decisions are: children’s 
schooling, consumption expenditures, major investments in business or land, the 
respondent’s participation in community or political activities, the respondent’s 
spouse participation in community or political activities, whether or not the 
respondent should work for an income, whether or not the spouse should work for 
an income and how much the household saves. In the analysis, a dummy is used 
that takes value 1 if the variable is above the median for each gender subsample. 
Business characteristics  
• Type of business, dummy variables for businesses shown on brochure 
• Business Literacy, scores of component 1 of a PCA for a set of questions about 
knowledge about how to run a business, and of competition. 
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Essay Two: Institutions and social norms when designing and evaluating 
development interventions: An application to the Pakistan Case Study 
 
“A major challenge in understanding real-world feedback processes is precisely this 
tendency to look at problems not as they actually are but in line with existing intellectual 
and conceptual frameworks- at least until is too late” 
 
Ben Ramalingam, Aid in the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a 
Complex World  
(2014)  
 
I. Motivation and Research Relevance 
The first essay of this dissertation featured a randomized evaluation in a very well 
controlled setting to assess whether an intervention of interest (a brochure designed on 
the basis of marketing practices and the concept of affinity) increased loan uptake in a 
microfinance program, particularly among women. This essay illustrates the lessons from 
the Pakistan case study32 and builds a framework to improve the design of development 
interventions.  The research uses theory-based evaluations, and in particular realistic 
evaluation for: a) better understanding the role of context on intervention results; b) 
improving the design of monitoring systems through the selection of indicators that pick 
up information on the internal processes and mechanisms triggered (or not) by a 
development intervention; c) phasing in formative, implementation, and impact 
evaluation to facilitate corrective measures over time. In this essay, context is defined as 
prevailing institutional settings (formal and informal) that can affect the magnitude or 
                                                           
32 The Pakistan case study provides a good link to the debate in the literature on the appropriateness of 
randomized evaluation vis-à-vis other evaluation methods 
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direction of development outcomes and impacts observed after the intervention is 
introduced.  
The framework intends to be a practitioner’s response to the challenge posed to 
the design of development interventions by complexity theory; and to generate 
knowledge that is usable for policy throughout implementation. This is occurring at a 
time in which donors and international development organizations look for alternatives to 
introduce or scale up in a more systematic manner promising interventions33. In doing 
this, the essay starts with an overview of the development aid debate and a discussion on 
complex adaptive systems. Then, experiential learning (Pritchett et al, 2013) and realistic 
evaluation (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) are introduced as key elements to connect design 
and evaluation approaches.   
I.1 The aid effectiveness debate and the call for rigorous evaluation 
Around a decade ago, the debate on development aid was very much represented 
by those calling for its expansion (with Sachs (2005) one of its most recognizable faces) 
and those calling for a significant reduction in aid (with Easterly (2007) among the most 
vocal in this line). Poor performance of many aid recipient countries (Morrisey, 2001), 
characterized by poor governance structures, lack of institutions, or lack of incentives 
(Collier, 2007; Easterly, 2008); plus accounts of potentially perverse effects of aid 
(Moyo, 2009) strengthened the arguments of aid skeptics, while the global economic 
                                                           
33 This quest for better ways to generate and use knowledge for policy has been translated in the recent 
proliferation of ‘Labs’ across donor organizations and also civil society; integrating the identification of 




crisis of 2008 increased pressure on elected officials in donor countries to justify aid 
budgets to tax payers34.  
The aid debate and the increased calls for accountability led to a stronger demand 
for rigorous evaluation of aid programs’ effectiveness. This generated an inherent tension 
between implementing organizations (typically with narrow missions and limited 
budgets) and donor or executive organizations that provide resources to them (Pritchett et 
al., 2013). For implementing organizations, there is pressure  to demonstrate as rigorously 
as possible that their programs worked, and donors focused more than ever in allocating 
resources to ‘what works’ in development. 
In this context, the importance of the evaluation function in development rapidly 
grew. In particular, the profile of randomized evaluations as a method was heightened, 
promising to determine if development outcomes could actually be attributed to 
development programs. Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) have been used in the 
pharmaceutical industry for decades, and their use in social sciences has increased 
dramatically since the mid-90s (Heckman and Smith, 1995), with a few paradigmatic 
papers regularly cited to highlight the method’s power and advantages (for example, 
Kremer and Miguel (2004) and Gertler (2004)).     
In Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty, 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011) make a strong case for rigorous evaluation that focuses on 
well-defined interventions to identify ‘what works’. Part of the problem, they argue, is 
that the aid debate has been too focused on ‘big questions’ for which an appropriate 
                                                           
34 However, it must be said that perceptions on the size of aid budgets were seriously overblown, 
particularly in the United States (World Public Opinion, 2010) 
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counterfactual does not exist. Instead, they call for pursuing concrete questions that can 
be answered through experimentation and that can affect life outcomes for the most 
disadvantaged.  Their book is in fact a compilation of cases in which mainly experimental 
methods were used to generate evidence on the effectiveness of development programs in 
given circumstances and countries, from microfinance schemes, to health programs, to 
institutional reforms.   
This view of development and of what constitutes evidence that Banerjee and 
Duflo propose has received its own share of criticism. Critics have warned of a 
temptation to subordinate the subject of development research to those policies for which 
randomization is suitable (Ravallion, 2011; Rodrik, 2010).  Some, like Easterly and 
Cohen (2010) speak of how “embracing RCTs has led development researchers to lower 
their ambition”, by arguing that randomized evaluation is not useful to answer some of 
the most important questions in development. Others point out that even when the 
method shows practitioners what to do, the conclusions may not be useful neither for 
policy nor the understanding of development problems (Das, Devarajan and Hammer, 
2011). Deaton (2010) formalizes the criticism as ‘the misunderstanding of exogeneity and 
the handling of heterogeneity’. 
On top of this, the method produces results with limited external validity. If the 
objective of randomized evaluation35   is that the policy or intervention can be then scaled 
up or replicated with the confidence of having established attribution, the problem is that 
the circumstances surrounding the experiment are quite different to those surrounding the 
                                                           
35 Or alternatively, instrumental variables or natural experiments as second-best alternatives 
recommended by most randomized evaluation proponents. 
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scaling up or replication of a policy, with the comparison of one situation to the other 
based on observables, which is the basic criticism that randomization advocates make of 
other estimation methods.  
Deaton ends his paper calling for experimentation aimed at the evaluation of 
theoretical mechanisms over the evaluation of projects, because heterogeneity in 
particular “is not a technical problem, but a symptom of something deeper, which is the 
failure to specify causal models of the processes we are examining”36.  In short, Deaton 
concludes that the evaluation of development programs has been focusing too much on 
asking ‘what works’, instead of understanding how and why a policy does (or does not) 
work. Philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright (2007) stresses this point, highlighting 
how the fundamental issue in development is not the purity of the methods, but the 
inherent complexity of the problem being studied.  
I.2 Complexity theory and the design and evaluation of development programs 
Banerjee and Duflo’s book goes well beyond evaluation and evidence. It also 
highlights how so many predictions of standard economic theory fail when translated into 
development interventions. They explain those failures in development policies in design 
flaws and the presence of the “ubiquitous three I’s: Ignorance, Ideology and Inertia”37. 
Part of the problem with the latter characterization is that human behavior 
(individual or collective) may follow a different logic than the rational choice expected 
from program stakeholders when a development intervention is designed. Beinhocker 
(2006) criticizes neoclassical economics for its assumption of perfect rationality, 
                                                           
36 Deaton (2008, p. 47) 
37 Banerjee and Duflo (2011, p.270) 
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“modeling smart people in unbelievably simple situations, […] when the real world 
involves simple people coping with unbelievably complex situations”. Instead, he favors 
the view of bounded rationality developed by Simon (1957) which argues that people 
have access to limited or biased information and make the best decisions they can with it. 
Beinhocker further argues that the economy is a complex adaptive system38 , a system 
never in equilibrium, in which diverse and autonomous components are linked through 
many different connections and where all components adapt to changes in the 
environment and to changes in the other components.  
The concept of complexity has been progressively embraced in development 
economics. Ostrom (2007) was adamant in her criticisms of panaceas in development, 
where simplistic analyses of complex systems lose sight of what really happens on the 
ground. Complexity in her view needs to be analyzed, understanding the different 
elements in a system being studied. 
A common practice in development is to design a development intervention 
around a logical framework approach, which maps a rather linear theory of change. The 
logical framework approach is an attempt to simplify reality in a causal chain that 
typically overlooks local context, and is based on a number of assumptions about 
behavior of stakeholders during implementation and along the causal chain. Alternative 
theory-driven approaches39  do accept and embrace complexity better than the logical 
framework, but the development community is still far from mainstreaming such a way 
                                                           
38 Following Beinhocker (2006) and Ramalingam (2014), five characteristics of complex adaptive systems 
can be identified: a) difficult to predict in detail; b) broad predictions about the system as a whole can be 
made, identifying patterns; c) emerging properties, patterns that arise from the system overall, not from 
the individual components; d) a trend toward greater complexity; and e) systems don’t tend to an 
equilibrium, meaning that each component is evolving and adapting. 
39 See, for example, Eyben’s (2008) work on meta-theories, power, and mutual accountability. 
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of thinking; even though several actors are contributing to this either piloting 
interventions or developing frameworks and toolkits that can be applied to specific 
programs40 .  
Figure 1. A Portfolio of Results Framework 
 
                     Source: Ramalingam (2014) 
Once a development intervention is designed and mapped considering alternative 
theories of change, the evaluator is expected to select the most appropriate tools for 
assessing each element of the chain, from the intervention itself to the impact it has on 
different drivers of change, and from those to different levels of results (output, outcome, 
impact). Ramalingam (2014) proposes a very basic bi-dimensional framework for 
mapping and assessing different development interventions based on their nature and the 
context in which they are introduced. Figure 1 summarizes this view. Notice in it how 
                                                           
40 An example of the former is recent experimentation in social accountability and capacity development 
done by Oxfam in Africa, in which a range of possible theories are identified and applied to a particular 
problem, and then their usefulness is assessed. An example of the latter is recent work done by the 
Methods Lab, a joint initiative of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affair and Trade, and the BetterEvaluation think tank. 
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RCT’s have a very specific application, when the context of the program is stable and 
homogeneous and the nature of the intervention is relatively simple. 
I.3 The evaluation function in a complex world 
Randomization was already growing in importance in the evaluation discipline 
before the latest iteration of the aid debate. It did so as part of the move towards 
measuring impact. Pritchett et al (2013) describe this evolution: they point out how the 
term project evaluation was not long ago still loosely and alternatively used to mean up to 
three different things: project valuation, implementation evaluation, and impact 
evaluation.  
The first use of the term evaluation was to describe an ex-ante analysis of 
development projects based on cost-benefit analysis (Dreze and Stern, 1987). It was 
assumed that the inputs in an intervention would produce the desired outcomes; the focus 
was in determining if the value of aggregated benefits was larger than the cost, compared 
to alternatives. Evaluation later became a retrospective look or certification process to see 
if the project was implemented as designed. Evaluation understood in this way focuses on 
disbursements, inputs, activities and outputs.     
Evaluation, however, is increasingly identified with impact evaluation, the ex-post 
analysis on how outcomes for intended beneficiaries are affected. Impact evaluation 
requires a counterfactual: a way to know what would have happened without the project. 
Randomized evaluations are one way to perform an impact evaluation, one that bases its 
appeal in the claim that when carefully done can virtually eliminate selection bias.  
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The rise of randomized evaluation was then a response to the claims of 
development effectiveness regularly made through project valuation and implementation 
evaluation, and the call for a focus in outcomes that would require a good counterfactual. 
In the quest for unambiguous attribution, practitioners have for a few years leaned 
towards identifying randomized evaluation as the only method for rigorous impact 
evaluation.  
However, a complex world and the limited capacity of randomized evaluation to 
generate understanding on the interaction between intervention and context requires a 
different way to design and implement evaluation. There are in fact many academics and 
practitioners developing and testing such evaluation protocols. Blattman (2008) proposes 
what he calls ‘Evaluation 2.0’ which takes into account context specificity and a focus on 
performance management and process learning, while Szekely (2011) develops the idea 
of integrating processes for institutionalized learning, in what he calls Results-based 
Social Policy Design and Implementation Systems (RSPDI). Khagram et al. (2011) 
suggest diagnostic, contextual approaches to experimentation and innovation, or Impact 
Planning Assessment Reporting and Learning Systems (IPARLS). Andrews et al. (2012) 
propose what they call Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA). And lastly, Pritchett 
et al. (2013) focus on the monitoring function and how it informs Evaluation through 
experiential (little ‘e’) learning, or MeE. All these different methods (and acronyms) are 
attempts to respond to that failure in identifying causal models of the processes studied 
that Cartwright (2007) and Deaton (2008) refer to. Deaton in particular called to move 
beyond the techniques and focus on how we generate and use knowledge, something that 
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can actually be traced all the way back to Greenberg’s (1968) Evaluation of Social 
Programs seminal paper, and also is a common feature in the action research literature.  
This essay does not intend to propose yet another method for design and 
evaluation. It identifies, from a practitioner’s perspective, key elements of the emerging 
models, and applies them to the microfinance program case in rural Pakistan. In 
particular, steps to consider social norms and institutional arrangements in analysis and 
design are emphasized. Section II introduces and then discusses the links between theory 
of change and realist evaluation. Section III presents the analytical framework that will 
help us reinterpret the results and context surrounding the cases study of Pakistan, and 
that is heavily influenced by complexity theory, realistic evaluation and structured 
experiential learning. Section IV discusses the evaluation results from Pakistan in light of 
the proposed framework, with recommendations for how to continuing the learning 
process in both cases. Section V concludes and discusses how the proposed framework 
could be useful for the international development community. 
II. Theoretical Framework  
The key to the discussion in this chapter is the concept of Theory of 
Change (ToC), which emerged from both the fields of program theory and program 
evaluation in the mid-1990s as a method to analyze the theories and assumptions behind 
programs, particularly in the social and political arenas (see Weiss, 1995). Thus, at its 
core, theory of change connects program design and program evaluation, a link that I 
emphasize here, and which is the same connection that Deaton (2010) refers to when 
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calling for experimentation to be used in the evaluation of theoretical mechanisms instead 
of the evaluation of projects.  
Theory of Change makes explicit and details the expected process of change of an 
intervention, explaining the causal linkages of an intervention: this allows to map 
outcomes over causal chain and the relationship between them over time. This forces 
stakeholders to distinguish desired and actual outcomes and to model desired outcomes 
before deciding on the intervention. 
From the evaluation point of view, ‘theory-oriented’ evaluation was developed  as 
a response to what was seen as ‘the original sins’ of the evaluation profession: playing a 
low key role in program design and management, avoiding the discussion of theoretical 
implications, and focusing in developing evaluation methods suitable to projects designed 
under ‘absolute rationality’ (Stame, 2004).  
Chen and Rossi’s (1989) paper is considered one of the earliest formulations of 
theory-oriented41 evaluation, and in it they describe some basic steps to follow for it: 
studying treatment; discussing the views on outcomes of stakeholders and evaluators; and 
examining why and how a program performs.  This paper focuses one of the main strands 
of theory-oriented evaluation: Realistic (or Realist) Evaluation developed by Pawson and 
Tilley (1997).  Realistic evaluation is interested in ‘program theory’, thinking about the 
responses of people to program activities. Appendix 1 lists the steps in undertaking 
realistic evaluation. 
 
                                                           
41 Chen and Rossi’s formulation was called theory-driven evaluation, while the latest approaches are 




In practical terms, realistic evaluation parallels theory of change since it involves 
hypothesizing in advance the mechanisms that are likely to operate, the contexts in which 
they may operate, and the outcomes that will be observed if they operate as expected, in 
what is known as Context-Mechanism-Outcome (CMO) hypotheses. Whether 
mechanisms work as expected at the time of implementation depends on context. As 
Box 1. Basic Definitions used in this Essay 
After an extensive literature review to support the essays in this dissertation, it is 
clear that a major problem in the way many existing approaches are presented is in 
the semantics. There are a number of concepts used freely in the academic and 
practitioner literature that can easily lead to confusion. The following definitions 
are drawn from Wong et al. (2013) and Westhorp (2014) and are the ones 
considered for this essay in particular. 
Impacts are positive or negative changes produced by a development intervention 
– directly or indirectly, intended or unintended- in the context of its environment, 
as it interacts with multiple factors affecting development change. Impact implies 
changes for people in their lives. 
Outcomes are short, medium and long term changes, intended and unintended, 
resulting from an intervention. Outcome implies change for people and their lives, 
but can also include other kind of changes (for organizations, workers, 
governments, etc.) 
Impact evaluation is a systematic and empirical investigation of the impacts 
produced by an intervention – it seeks to establish whether an intervention has 
made a difference in the lives of people. It aims to answer questions about what 
works, how, for whom and why. An impact evaluation addresses causation (how 
programs cause change) and attribution (whether observed changes can be 
attributed to the program or were caused by other things). 
Mechanisms are the underlying causal processes that happen before the outcomes 
we observe. Development interventions in a given context trigger mechanisms, 
and these condition the outcomes we observe.  
Program mechanism is the interaction between what the program provides and the 
reasoning of its intended target population that causes the outcomes. 
Source: Wong et al. (2013) and Westhorp (2014) 
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complexity theory literature argues, the most relevant networks of causation for the 
problem at stake should be selected to articulate solutions that are most likely to have an 
effect on desired outcomes (Ramalingam, 2014). In Westhorp’s (2014) framework, “what 
matters about context is what influences, whether mechanisms operate, and which 
mechanisms operate”42.   
Figure 2 helps in visualizing this. What follows is a framework to identify 
elements of context and the mechanisms at play when designing an evaluation. 
Figure 2. The Context – Mechanism – Outcome (CMO) Hypothesis 
 
      Source: Author’s conceptualization 
 
                                                           
42 Westhorp (2014, p. 6). Wong et al. (2013) also highlight the role of realism and context:  “In summary, 
realism holds that mechanisms matter because they generate outcomes, and that context matters 
because it changes…the processes by which an intervention produces an outcome. Both context and 
mechanism must therefore be systematically researched along with intervention and outcome. By 
implication, research or evaluation designs that strip away or ‘control’ for context with a view to exposing 
the ‘pure’ effect of the intervention limit our ability to understand how, when and for whom the 
intervention will be effective” (p.13). 
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III. Analytical Framework 
III.1 From intervention to mechanisms: Looking at formal and informal institutions 
The focus of this paper is on context as prevailing formal and informal 
institutions, using North (1990) and Little (1991) framing. This look at institutions when 
analyzing context is based on the little attention that interventions based on best practice 
approaches pay to the role of institutional practices and organization on program 
impact43.  
North defines institutions as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction […] consisting of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules 
(constitutions, laws, property rights)”. Little, on the other hand, discusses the constituents 
of institutions: norms (formal and informal, deliberately inculcated and reinforced and 
those influencing the behavior of agents); procedures; routinized behaviors; and rules. 
Context, in the form of formal and informal institutions, determines how good a given 
intervention is at triggering a targeted mechanism.  
The four constituents of institutions act through development actors at three 
levels44: the participating agents (workers, mid-level officers and leaders), the 
organization itself (particularly looking at its structures and how it preserves its 
                                                           
43 Andrews (2010) calls this ‘isomorphic mimicry’, a view of institutional reform that is based on the form 
of the desired change instead of the functions that the related institutions need to have for an 
intervention to work. 
44 I borrow Andrews et al. (2012) elements of organizations that bring about change under their Problem-
Driven Implementation Approach (PDIA). The selection of the PDIA approach for this framework is based 
on the characteristics it shares with realistic evaluation, particularly the heavy weight it assigns to context, 
and the focus on problems over pre-defined solutions, parallel to the emphasis on not defining the tool to 
be used in the evaluation before establishing what are the questions that the tools need to answer. 
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legitimacy), and the ecosystem of the organization (an open or closed system, and the 
incentives provided from above to innovate or not). The magnitude and direction of the 
intervention’s effect will then depend on the presence or absence of:  
i. An ecosystem with ‘authorizing environments’ for decision-making (particularly if 
they encourage experimentation and ‘positive deviance’) 
ii. Organizations with active learning mechanisms and iterative feedback loops, and 
iii. Broad engagement of agents for assuring viability, legitimacy and relevance.  
Thus, when evaluating a program, this framework warrants initially questioning 
how the originally planned intervention is modified by the different elements of context 
when implemented. The evaluation tools for this part of the analysis can include a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative tools, aiming at answering questions such as: 
i. Is the change introduced by the intervention supported by all the relevant players 
ii. Are the internal structure and functions of the implementing organization 
conducive to a successful implementation? 
iii. Are all elements of society, particularly the target population, aware and 
supportive of the intervention? 
iv. Is the intervention, due to context, triggering other mechanisms instead or aside 
of the targeted one, with potential consequences (positive or negative) in terms of 
outcomes? 
Organizational analysis, behavioral analysis, political economy analysis, among 
others can be used as part of  implementation evaluation, formative evaluation, or process 
evaluation to assess whether the intervention was successfully implemented (and why it 
was or not the case), to evaluate if the intervention actually triggered the targeted 
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mechanism, and if other behaviors were triggered during implementation. Appendix 2 
features a tentative list of tools used as part of the monitoring and evaluation process that 
could generate information on the path from intervention to mechanism.  
Figure 3 on the other hand, shows how the intervention may be affected by 
context and end up triggering other mechanisms (such as resistance from a key 
stakeholder to the reform introduced), or affecting the strength with which the 
intervention triggers the targeted mechanism. 
Figure 3. From Context to Mechanisms 
 
                                     Source: Author’s conceptualization 
III.2 Triggering Mechanisms: Change in a complex world 
A development intervention is designed and implemented under the assumption 
that it will trigger a mechanism, causing changes in behavior from key actors that lead to 
expected outcomes. Once the intervention is introduced, context may either:  
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i. alter the magnitude of the effect of the intervention over the mechanism altering 
expected outcomes; or  
ii. trigger alternative mechanisms that may influence the final outcome.  
Mechanisms are subject to context, and this interaction is what determines how 
change happens in a given place and time. Here I follow Eyben et al.’s (2008) discussion 
of Meta-theories and Archetypes, to understand the drivers of change.  They provided an 
analysis focused on political change, but that can be adapted to other types of programs 
(including microfinance). In a previous work, Eyben (2008) argued how, even if 
unconsciously, people use theory for explaining the world to themselves and to others, 
and what is perceived as usual way of thinking about the world shapes their practice. 
New ways of thinking offer the potential to make choices about practice. Hence, when we 
interpret a development problem, we use different lenses (systemic meta-theories) to 
understand its dynamics.  
The common way to interpret reality used in development projects is the 
framework of rational choice, where change is the unintended consequence of individual 
choice. However, it is important to recognize the existence of other ways to see the 
world, and understand that in certain scenarios, rational choice might not be the best way 
to understand the outcome of a development program, because some of the development 
actors engaged (or whose behavior the program aims to change) might manage a different 
view of the same reality, and this needs to be considered in the policy design. Alternative 
meta-theories include, for example, evolution, where variation, selection and 
amplification are the dominant drivers; structuralism, for which changes in relations of 
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production and economic power structures are the driving forces; long term shifts in deep 
underlying norms, values and beliefs; among others45.  
An archetype, on the other hand, is the identification of how under a dominant 
meta-theory, change can actually happen in a given place and time. Think for example of 
participatory development: if change in a given context can happen through active 
citizenship, then a participatory program merely providing spaces for participation 
(demand side of governance) may be enough to trigger change; if experience shows that 
change does not happen unless local elites are on board, then elite networking or 
coalitions may be the needed focus to consider when designing the program; if 
experience shows that it is through contagion that change occurs, demonstration effects 
and localized pilots of new approaches should likely be the focus of the intervention. 
Thus, when Banerjee and Duflo (2011) say that many of the failures in 
development are due to the “ubiquitous three Is: ignorance, ideology and inertia”, it may 
well be that stakeholders’ reaction to the intervention is due to a non-linear, bounded 
rationality scheme as meta-theory, or the assumption of a certain archetype of change, 
while the intervention was designed with a rational choice approach. In realistic 
evaluation lingo, the intervention, as designed, did not trigger the expected mechanisms, 
generating unexpected results46. In this environment, realistic evaluation looks at context 
and the mechanisms that were supposed to be triggered by the intervention, and helps 
                                                           
45 Beinhocker (2006) does an abstraction of ‘drivers’ of complexity economics and that are behind many 
of these meta-theories. These are dynamics, agents, networks, emergence and evolution. 
46 Results can also be unexpected and negative ones when there are alternative mechanisms triggered 
(such as the negative reaction of men to the female brochure in the Pakistan case study) 
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better understand why an intervention may not have had the expected result for a given 
group of expected beneficiaries.  
III.3 Evaluation: From Intervention to Outcomes 
Realistic evaluation can assess the intermediate steps from intervention to 
outcomes and how the assumptions behind the original hypothesis are strengthened or 
weakened along the process. This exercise feeds information that can be used in the re-
design of development interventions.   
A useful representation of how the intervention loses steam through context or 
acting mechanisms and at different levels of outputs is the one provided by White (2014) 
as the “Funnel of Attrition”. As Figure 4 shows, achieving development outcomes 
depends on a number of factors that should be considered at the design stage. 
Figure 4. The Funnel of Attrition 
 
Source: White (2014) 
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Along the funnel, only the people that reach a given step can experience the 
benefits of the step that follows. In other words, only those people for which the outputs 
have been realized can actually achieve the desired outcomes in the last step.  
The literature review that supports this essay informs the identification of 
different elements of an evaluation that is built upon the C-M-O hypothesis that underlies 
a development program: 
i. Before Implementation:  For the type of intervention explored, the C-M-O 
hypothesis is defined and informs the discussion of strengths and potential pitfalls 
of the alternative intervention designs with local experts and practitioners, with 
intensive evidence review also conducted. At this design stage, limitations in the 
intervention can be corrected. The information may even lead to the conclusion 
that the proposed intervention is not adequate given the prevailing institutions and 
prevailing agents’ behavior. 
ii. Formative and Implementation Evaluation: Most impact evaluation specialists 
prefer analyzing large scale programs to achieve enough statistical power, but this 
is of no relevance if the program has technical problems during implementation, 
or if the targeted population is not interested in the program.  This stage 
encourages the experimentation of promising approaches identified in the pre-
evaluation stage at a small scale, with strong emphasis in monitoring key 
indicators developed on the basis of the C-M-O hypothesis, for an iterative 
learning process, similar to what Pritchett et al. (2013) propose as ‘experiential 
learning’. The idea is to try a design of the intervention in one community, learn, 
adapt and try it in a few more. Each intervention tested is monitored doing causal 
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chain analysis along the funnel of attrition. This part of the evaluation can very 
well be based on factual analysis. Advanced planning is highly desirable so 
appropriate monitoring indicators are tracked, and the information generated is 
policy oriented. 
iii. Impact Evaluation. The previous elements help understand the process at play 
during program implementation. There is however, still an important role to play 
for experimental and quasi-experimental methods that are able to answer if a 
given intervention does work or not. This evaluation, however, has a stronger 
factual basis, because the design of the intervention has considered context and 
potential alternative mechanisms triggered, and the previous analysis generates 
information to better understand the outcomes.47  West et al. (2008) classifies  
alternatives to RCT designs for strengthening causal inference in three major 
categories:  
- Randomized Encouragement, with random assignment to different 
intervention designs. 
- Non-Random Quantitative Assignment, with treatment only applied to those 
people falling below a threshold for one of the outcome variables. An example 
of a method in this category is regression discontinuity. 
-  Observational Studies, where participants in preexisting or constructed 
groups receive various treatment conditions, and selection bias is controlled 
using matching and stratifying techniques.  
                                                           
47 Alternatively, the use of mainstream impact evaluation methods can be embedded in program 
implementation. For example, this can include randomizing the assignment of small variations (nudges) of 
the intervention as part of formative evaluation. On this particular point, see Pritchett et al. (2013). 
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I now revisit the Pakistan case study, highlighting the context, the mechanisms at 
play and the outcomes of the program introduced, and proposing an evaluation design 
that is able to assess not only if the intervention works, but how and why it does so, and 
provides recommendations for adapting the interventions to better respond to context. 
IV. Applying the Framework: Microfinance Experiment in Pakistan  
The marketing experiment testing the effect of a brochure with women managing 
small businesses (compared to a brochure with the same businesses but managed by men) 
concluded that exposure to the brochure decreased the demand for the new microfinance 
product among the poorer and least educated women (and men) members of NRSP credit 
groups.  
Further, essay one ended explaining how, in hindsight, the results of the 
experiment as it was designed could have been reached with a comprehensive data 
analysis of available information on women’s demand for credit in Pakistan, demand for 
credit among female members of the participating microfinance organization, and even 
using the data from baseline, collected one full year before the brochures were distributed 
(November 2006, compared to orientation and brochure distribution in November 2007). 
This factual analysis could have been used to inform an alternative design of the 
brochures that considered a context of limited participation of women in economic 
activity. Still, the experiment provided evaluators and microfinance organization with 
very rich information for similar programs. What follows is a systematic review of how 
(unexpected) change happened as a consequence of the intervention, and a proposed 
framework to design evaluation of similar initiatives in rural Pakistan moving forward. 
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IV.1 Understanding the Experiment’s Results 
Figure 5 synthetizes the C-M-O hypothesis evaluated; the relevant characteristics 
of context; how the context translates into agents’ behavior; the expected and additional 
mechanisms triggered and a comparison between expected and actual outcomes48. 
The development problem that the microfinance organization tries to solve is a 
low loan take up among female members of its credit groups in rural Pakistan. The 
literature on microfinance has a very rich spectrum of prospective solutions for the 
problem, including preferential interest rates, insurance schemes, and business skills 
training, among others. Marketing is only one alternative solution among many, a type of 
intervention particularly appealing given its relatively low cost, and with the backing of 
well documented literature on its impact in behavioral change. 
The conclusion of the experiment was not that marketing is ineffective as a tool to 
increase take up rates among women in rural Pakistan; but that one particular design, the 
brochure featuring women leading five small businesses considered typical of average 
microcredit clients, does not achieve the desired outcomes, compared to the  brochure 




                                                           
48 For illustration purposes, only the C-M-O hypothesis or theory of change for the marketing experiment 
is featured here. However, consider that the marketing intervention represents one element of the larger 
C-M-O hypothesis for the microfinance experiment of expanding the loan amount that credit group 









IV.1.1 Context Analysis 
Evaluating the C-M-O hypothesis behind the experiment increases the evaluator’s 
understanding of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ the intervention works or not. Data from the 
experiment and the baseline provided evidence on elements of context at play, 
particularly social norms about women’s role in the participating communities. Three 
particular patterns arise from the analysis:  
i. Limited decision making of women in the household. Even among female business 
owners, 40 percent declare that their husband makes the main business decisions, 
such as purchase of inputs, hiring, and marketing. 
ii. Limited mobility of women within and beyond the community. Earlier studies of 
microfinance in Pakistan such as the one from Nenova et al. (2009) indicate that 
microfinance has traditionally been targeted to men rather than women precisely 
because low female mobility and gender segregation in labor markets. The 
baseline confirms this, as female business owners operate the business mainly 
from home, as they are the ones more likely to observe purdah. 
iii. Low regard for the household business as economic activity. Use of time modules 
included as part of the baseline and follow up surveys indicate that female 
business owners dedicate very little time to the business, and the same applies to 
their husbands, who on average dedicate more time to agricultural activities. In 
this sense, the data challenges the assumption of ‘entrepreneurs-in-waiting’ only 





IV.1.2 Agents’ Behavior and Mechanisms 
Factual analysis, confirmed by the results of the experiment, provides a picture of 
an environment restrictive of women engagement in economic activities and general 
mobility. As a result, microfinance organizations’ rules and programs typically did not 
target women in any special way before the marketing experiment was introduced and as 
a consequence, lent more to men than women in terms of number and amount of loans.  
On top of this, credit group members (men and women) show a relatively low 
demand for loans. Average size of loan before the experiment was Rs. 12,000 (US$140), 
even though the regular program allowed borrowing up to Rs. 30,000 (US$350). And as 
Table 1 shows, four out of five credit group members that never took a loan between 
2002 and 2006 indicated having not done so because they ‘do not like to borrow’. This is 
quite an important piece of information, because the outcome being measured by the 
experiment is take up of the new loan program (which offered access to loans for up to 
Rs. 100,000), not to the regular loan. Again, in hindsight, with most business of credit 
group members being small in scale and sales (which is particularly the case for female 
business owners), and an already low demand for credit in terms of the loan amount, the 
content of the brochure probably needed a more careful design in order to have a stronger 














Percent borrowing from [source] in 2006 5.07 83.43 33.77 21.12
Do not like to borrow 52.55 81.39 70.81 74.69
Inadequate collateral 18.50 1.98 11.94 6.77
Lender's procedures are too cumbersome 14.49 9.31 6.70 5.82
Lender's loan terms are unfavorable 5.48 0.59 3.35 0.91
Lender is too far away 3.18 0.40 0.78 1.35
Need to pay bribes 2.02 0.79 2.18 0.08
Past default with lender 1.96 0.79 0.89 1.15
CO members not willing to lend to me 1.25 4.55 2.51 6.53
Bad credit history 0.56 0.20 0.84 2.69
The main [reason] for not borrowing from [source]?
Credit Source
 
Source: Baseline survey 2006 
As a result of this context, the female brochure triggered a negative reaction in 
terms of take up from the households that from a development point of view should be 
the main target of the program, relative to the male brochure.  This lower take up restricts 
the access to the expected development outcomes down the results chain behind 
microfinance programs. 
IV.2 Using analysis for intervention design and evaluation 
IV.2.1 Informing intervention design 
As previously stated, the results of the marketing experiment do not provide 
conclusive evidence on the lack of effectiveness of marketing in microfinance, only of 
one particular design, for one particular objective (take up of large loan program), and for 
segments of the target population (women, and particularly the poorest among them).  
With a stronger understanding of the context and the mechanisms at play, it is 
now possible to propose alternative marketing interventions by ‘crawling the design 
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space’ (Pritchett et al., 2013). This requires the identification of the different elements of 
the design of marketing tools that can be used in the Pakistani rural setting. Assuming 
that within the category of marketing interventions the focus is on a low cost solution 
such as a brochure49, alternative brochure designs could consider: 
i. Brochure recipients (e.g. every member, only women, only women identified as 
belonging to the poorest households, only women that have not borrowing history 
with the microfinance organization). 
ii. Brochure Product (e.g. access to the increased loan or the regular loan program) 
iii. Brochure Content (e.g. pictures - maybe showing only household-based 
businesses- cartoons, success stories of people similar to the selected brochure 
recipient) 
iv. Brochure Main characters (e.g. only women, only men, or men and women 
working together in the business) 
v. Brochure Support (e.g. local leader publicly supporting the possibility of women 
leading a business, successful borrowers sharing their stories).  
vi. Brochure Timing (e.g. brochure distribution at the time of business skills training, 
at orientation, or repeated exposure during the loan application period).  
IV.2.2 Stages of Program Evaluation 
The new evaluation is then designed following the phases previously described: 
i. Before Implementation:  a shortlist of alternative designs of the marketing 
intervention is discussed with practitioners, local leaders and actual clients to fine 
                                                           
49 Distributing a brochure with program information is only one particular way of marketing the program. 
Radio, advertising in public areas, door to door information provision are examples of alternative 
marketing tools that could be introduced. 
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tune and define which ones will be field-tested. As an example of what a brochure 
informed by different dimensions of the design space could include two candidate 
brochures that would be distributed among women members of credit groups with 
relatively worst socio-economic indicators: 
- Brochure 1: distributed only to female credit group members from the poorest 
households in the community, promoting the regular and the increased loan 
program, using pictures of women leading household-based businesses,  
distributed at orientation, with no additional backing. 
- Brochure 2: exact same design, but with pictures of the same businesses in the 
original brochure, showing both men and women leading them.    
ii. Formative/ Implementation Evaluation: The next step is to test the selected 
designs in limited areas and for a short period of time. Each brochure is tested in 
one community where NRSP works, but that was not included in the original 
experiment. Any changes in the actual demand for loans but also in the attitudes 
towards borrowing and towards owning a business are registered. For this to 
work, a monitoring system is set up that includes not only administrative data, but 
also qualitative information on household attitudes towards the brochure and 
towards borrowing in general. This data is collected through focus groups with 
members, analysis of existing female-led businesses and potential market for new 
businesses. For a sample of credit group members (men, women, business owners 
and not business owners) this can be complemented with behavioral analysis 
inquiring about people reactions to different scenarios to assess prevalence of risk 
aversion and perceived social restrictions to economic activities. 
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At the end of the formative evaluation, each brochure design would have been 
assessed against the different stages of the Funnel of Attrition, and the brochure 
design(s) that feature the least attrition along the causal chain is (are) selected for 
scale-up and impact evaluation.  Information collected during the monitoring of 
the pilot is used for improving design if needed. 
iii. Impact Evaluation. The most promising brochure designs identified during the 
formative evaluation stage and for which monitoring indicators have been 
collected during implementation evaluation are scaled-up and evaluated. A 
control group is set up consisting of credit group members not exposed to any of 
the brochure designs, past or present. The monitoring system of the pilot phase 
informs the system set up for the scale-up phase, which will introduce questions 
in the baseline and follow up surveys of attitudes and household and business 
dynamics identified as relevant during the pilot phase. This includes the inclusion 
of qualitative indicators that keep track of how context still affects program 
performance and how.  
Depending on resources, timeframe and the group of people exposed to the 
brochures, a combination of methods can be used. Randomized encouragement 
designs with alternative intervention arms can be combined with regression 
discontinuity if the brochure is applied to members of different socio-economic 






V. Epilogue: The Way Forward in Design and Evaluation 
Twelve years ago, I started my international development career working in 
program evaluation at a multilateral organization. Back then, the evaluation function was 
still very much about pure cost-benefit analysis, despite an emergent trend towards 
results-based management.  
A lot has happened since then. The turn towards rigorous impact evaluation that 
emphasizes the elimination of selection bias could be seen as a pendulum movement, 
from the days of low ambition in the evaluation function, to the meticulous quest for 
unequivocal attribution. The price of the transition has been a trend towards disregarding 
context and focusing too much in significance levels of variables of interest. At the height 
of the movement towards randomized evaluation, I recall sitting in numerous 
presentations where questions about how institutions, behaviors or human interaction 
influence and condition the results posed to the presenter were answered in a similar way: 
random assignment controls for that.  
The evaluation profession, however, seems to be in the path to a more balanced 
approach to the problem. There is an increasing understanding that the causal chain from 
intervention to outcomes needs to be understood, looking at how the intervention was 
implemented, how and why it worked, and for whom. Evaluation set up in this way is 
less prone to speculation on how to interpret results, and more useful for policy. 
As part of this process, there is emerging interest at promoting a better connection 
between evaluation and design. The consolidation of theory of change approaches and the 
recognition of complexity theory open an opportunity for a better dialogue between 
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program officers in charge of design and evaluators. This essay shows how a focus on 
context and its effect on mechanisms can contribute to improve the design of 
development programs, and lead to evaluation that answers the questions needed for 
policy prioritization and scale up. The result is an approach that emphasizes ‘best fit’ in 
intervention design by leveraging what has been learned in previous experiences and 
adapting the intervention type to respond better to context. This has significant 
consequences in terms of cost of implementation and of evaluation, by prioritizing the 
piloting and later scale-up of promising interventions that internalize context by design, 
disregarding intervention designs that while popular or appealing based on experience 
elsewhere, are not likely to be adopted by key stakeholders, and making a more rational 
and systematic use of the wide range of quantitative and qualitative methods in the 
evaluation toolbox. 
In the Pakistan case study, the proposed approach frames the problem in a 
different way than the original experiment. In the latter, the design of the overall field 
experiment was set up to answer if marketing would increase take up in microfinance 
programs in rural Pakistan. Moreover, that evaluation was embedded in a larger endeavor 
of assessing if either lack of access to credit or lack of business skills constrained 
entrepreneurship. The experiment failed to recognize that only one of many possible 
interventions tackling each of those questions was being evaluated. Thus, the failure of 
the female brochure in stimulating take up among poorest households is not enough to 
conclude that marketing tools are useless in rural Pakistan, in the same way that the 
apparent success of business training among men does not mean that it is skills and not 
money the constraint to entrepreneurship in rural Pakistan. In fact, access to credit was 
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not a problem for participants: many of them had been members of credit groups for 
years, with average loan size less than half of what was available to them. 
The proposed framework changes the research question from the onset. The focus 
is not in knowing if marketing works; instead, the question is how marketing works better 
in overcoming restrictive social norms and risk aversion. And that is a significantly more 






















Appendix 1. Steps involved in undertaking Realistic Evaluations 
 
The Realistic Evaluation has no set steps, but Blamey and Mackenzie (2007) map it in the 
following way for comparison purposes: 
Step 1: Through dialogue with program implementers, evaluator looks to understand the 
nature of the program, of the target population at whom it is aimed; in what kind of 
context will it operate; and what are the prevailing theories around the type of program 
under analysis. 
Step 2: Evaluator maps out a series of potential mini-theories that relate the various 
contexts of a program to the multiple mechanisms by which it might operate to produce 
different outcomes. For example, practitioner knowledge and existing evidence base 
might suggest that a component of a program should focus on one particular topic. 
Step 3: The evaluator undertakes an ‘outcome inquiry’ in relation to these mini theories. 
This involves building up a quantitative and qualitative picture of the program in action. 
This includes an assessment of the extent to which underlying mechanisms (motivation, 
incentives, social norms, or institutional culture) are triggered by specific interventions in 
target groups. 
Step 4: Through exploration of how context, mechanisms and outcome (CMO) 
configurations play out, the evaluator refines and develops tentative theories of what 







Appendix 2. Common M&E Tools  
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Essay Three: We built it, they came. Now what? Participatory Strategies in 
Municipalities of Peru: The Case of El Alto, Piura50 
“Unfortunately, policy decisions on local participatory development have historically 
been driven by fads […] Passionate advocates spark a wave of interest, followed, after a 
few years, by disillusionment, which gives ammunition to centralizers to engineer a 
sharp reversal…” (Mansuri and Rao, 2011b) 
 
I. Introduction 
The final essay deals with the challenges of introducing an institutional reform: 
local government-led participatory processes arising in districts across Peru during the 
last decade, with a case study for El Alto, a district in the northern region of Piura. In late 
2012, the Mayor’s office asked the Peruvian think tank FORO Nacional- Internacional to 
evaluate their participatory strategy51, launched in January 2011, and to provide 
recommendations for its future. I joined FORO in this endeavor, under the Measuring 
Institutional Impact in the Region of the Americas (MIRA) initiative of the Inter-
                                                           
50 I acknowledge funding from the Inter-American Development Bank, through its Measuring Impact of 
Institutional Reform in the Americas (MIRA initiative) competition for the design and implementation of 
this evaluation; and total collaboration from local authorities of the El Alto district in Piura, Peru, 
particularly of Mayor Zarate. The original design of the evaluation was selected for funding through a 
regional competition, and had to be adapted to the realities of the field, the political economy of the area, 
and the political events during the fieldwork. In collaboration with the local think tank FORO Nacional-
Internacional, field workers were trained and sent to El Alto to monitor and record proceedings of 
neighborhood meetings and collect information from official records and through structured interviews. 
All analysis and any mistake or omission found in this paper is of my exclusive responsibility, and does not 
represent the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, FORO Nacional Internacional, or the 
Municipality of El Alto. 
51 A “participatory strategy” is defined as a set of interventions to gather preferences and concerns of 
citizens and use them in the design, monitoring or evaluation of policy. As this study shows, the 
participatory strategy of El Alto featured a number of interventions phased in a three year period, and 




American Development Bank.  Together with the research team at FORO, we turned this 
retrospective evaluation with very limited data into an opportunity to collaborate in the 
redesign of the participatory strategy in El Alto. Accordingly, this study goes beyond the 
assessment of immediate program objectives, and evaluates the implementation of the 
strategy, identifying the mechanisms at play, and highlighting existing gaps in the 
strategy. This information leads then to concrete policy recommendations to improve the 
strategy by “crawling the design space” (Pritchett, Samji and Hammer, 2013). .  
Another particular feature of this evaluation is the unit of analysis. It focuses on a 
strategy, understood as a set of interventions and the institutional setting surrounding 
them. Thus, the research is built on recent literature related to strategy evaluation (Patrizi 
and Quinn Patton, 2010), participation and its alleged shortcomings (Mansuri and Rao, 
2011a; Banerjee, Duflo, Glernnerster and Khemani, 2010); the call for participatory 
approaches that integrate demand and supply-side of governance (Fox, 2014); and 
experiential learning (Pritchett, Samji and Hammer, 2013) 
I.1 The Participatory Development debate 
Recent impact evaluations of participatory development programs tend to 
highlight their shortcomings. For example, Banerjee et al. (2010) conclude their 
influential randomized evaluation of participatory mechanisms in the education sector in 
India with a categorical statement: 
“Whatever the explanation, it seems clear that the current faith in participation as a 
panacea for the problems of service delivery is unwarranted. It is possible that it can be 
made to work on a more systematic basis, but it would take a lot of patience and 
experimentation to get there” (p.25, italics are mine). 
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The study of participatory development programs has in fact fluctuated from 
overly optimistic, generating high expectations, to grim and leading to categorical and 
negative assessments52.   
Mansuri and Rao (2011a) refer to the manner in which participation has been 
introduced in community-based development programs and part of decentralization 
processes as ‘a tarnished silver bullet’. They call for a contextually sensitive diagnosis of 
the relationship between civil society, government and markets, so the strategy of local 
development can be adapted accordingly. They have a very valid point: participatory 
programs are typically conceptualized as the solution to market and government failures; 
so citizen involvement is assumed to be a guarantee of service delivery targeted to a 
community’s needs, and of downward accountability. This view however, ignores that 
‘civil society failures’ are also possible and may distort the expected outcomes of 
participation (see Box 1). 
Gaventa and Barrett (2010) show a mixed but more encouraging picture of 
participation. Their systematic review and outcome mapping of 100 case studies in 
twenty countries shows that negative examples are many times related  to citizen 
engagement hitting ‘bureaucratic brick walls’, government failure to implement 
decisions, and even reprisals (sometimes, violent). They also recommend to carefully 
study the context of civil society, but with a different aim: to identify the ways citizens 
already participate (e.g., social organizations, associations, self-help groups), and then 
build programs around these, instead of imposing imported participatory mechanisms 
                                                           
52 The World Bank Participation Sourcebook (1996) can be considered an example of the former, and 
Cooke and Khotari (2001) of the latter, and in between, there is a rich literature. See, among many others, 








In a similar line, Crocker (2006) classifies and responds to the major objections to 
the ideal of deliberative participation: asymmetry of power (also called indeterminacy), 
autonomy and realism, all of which can be linked to civil society bonding failures53.  
These objections are used as arguments to conclude that participation ‘does not work’, or 
at least, that its use is not warranted. Crocker, however, stresses that they can be 
overcome through better institutional designs. At least two of those objections, namely 
asymmetries of power and realism, are in fact reasons for which participation may not 
work as expected, not flaws of participation itself: the participatory method chosen could 
be perfected or adapted to improve its performance.  
The autonomy objection, on the other hand requires a differentiated response, 
since the imposition of participatory development in contexts where hierarchical 
decision-making is the rule might backfire and even compromise the integrity of 
minorities or activists. Crocker  provides again criteria to respond to this, consistent with 
the value of agency (Sen, 1999), inquiring if everyone is really in agreement with the 
                                                           
53 Realism objection can be linked to both binding and bridging failures of civil society. 
Box 1. Civil Society Failures: Bonding and Bridging 
Bonding failures are internal  to the group, e.g. elite in a village capture public resources for private 
gain, intergroup violence, or when a community cannot devise equitable and efficient rules of 
engagement or to manage common property. 
Bridging failures arise when citizens cannot organize to correct for government or market failures, e.g. 
when a community cannot hold service providers or local officials accountable for resource allocation 
or quality of public services. 
Source: Mansuri and Rao (2011b) 
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prevailing system; if everyone in the community has information about alternatives; and 
if those in disagreement have the right and means to exit the group (Reich, 2002). 
I.2  Evaluating participation 
A literature review of participatory development programs observes that their 
effectiveness is typically assessed in terms of ‘it works’ or ‘it does not work’. This is not 
exclusive of the evaluation of participation, but it is notorious because participatory 
programs are typically implemented as a method to plan, monitor, implement or assess a 
development process54, but in the literature they are judged with the same criteria used 
for more concrete interventions that have mechanisms more amenable to measurement, 
such as cash transfers, infrastructure provision, or the increase in the number of nurses or 
teachers in a locality.  
Understanding success in participatory programs, requires a look beyond 
individual interventions, that allows exploring how and why participation works (or does 
not work) in a given context. Fox (2014), for example, offers quite an interesting 
perspective on how to assess social accountability, a concept that in general refers to 
development interventions attempting to improve public sector performance by bolstering 
both citizen engagement and government responsiveness in one or more of three 
dimensions: transparency, participation and accountability (O’Meally, 2013; World 
Bank, 2004). Fox argues that the existing evidence from impact evaluations leads to 
different conclusions on social accountability when it is seen either as a tactical or a 
strategic approach.  
                                                           
54 In this regard, Bell (1994) talks of ‘the tyranny of methodology’ in participatory approaches and the way 
they are exported to developing countries.  
101 
 
A tactical approach involves the use and analysis of a bounded intervention. 
When applied to social accountability, a tactical approach typically refers only to the 
demand-side of the problem (civil society based efforts) and assumes that information 
provision alone will inspire a strong enough collective action to influence public sector 
performance. A strategic approach, on the other hand, involves the use or analysis of 
multiple tactics or tools that are (at least in theory) mutually-reinforcing. This type of 
approach focuses on understanding enabling environments for collective action, and 
attempts to coordinate demand-side initiatives with government reforms (supply-side)55. 
Thus, Fox’s review concludes that while the evidence of results of tactical 
approaches is mixed (and tends to be interpreted as negative), the evidence on strategic 
approaches is much more promising. Assessing participation as a strategy, however, 
requires looking at it as the sum of different elements that taken individually may have a 
partial impact, only under certain conditions, and only for certain dimensions of the 
problem at stake. The tactical versus strategic debate poses indeed a challenge for 
evaluation. The literature has been relatively late at providing methodological alternatives 
that suit particularly the evaluation of strategies, even though evaluation of the work of 
organizations and of large policy frameworks has been common for a long time. Patrizi 
and Quinn Patton (2010) try to fill this void with case studies and a proposed 
methodology, which will be used throughout this essay. 
I.3 The value of participation 
                                                           
55 The tactical vs. strategic debate is not original from the social development arena: it originated in the 
business strategy and planning literature for the private sector. Mintzberg et al. (2005) and Mintzberg 
(2007) are common references in the discussion of strategy and strategy evaluation in the private sector. 
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Even after defining the best way to evaluate a participatory strategy, the question 
remains of what outcomes of participation to assess. Participation is typically designed as 
a component of a larger program, with its goal a combination of improved service 
delivery and downward accountability of service providers or local authorities56. This 
instrumental value is important, but it is not the only value of participation. Alkire 
(2002), based on Sen’s assessment of the value of democracy, argues that participation 
has also intrinsic and constructive value57.  
Indeed, Mansuri and Rao (2011b) admit that “there appears to be some intrinsic 
value of participation: people are generally happier when consulted…” However, 
measuring changes in collective capacity or the achievement of agency is quite 
challenging, as the limited use of such indicators across the literature indicates.  And even 
when proxies linked to intrinsic and constructive value are considered, there is pressure 
(in the operational, political and academic realms) to report results for a very limited span 
of time, even though the kind of transformational effects related to intrinsic and 
constructive values  typically require a long time to be observed.  
I.4 Quality and potential of participatory mechanisms 
The other key dilemma is how to tackle and measure the quality of participation. 
Crocker’s (2006) classification from thinner to thicker modes of participation in group 
                                                           
56 The latest World Bank report on Demand for Good Governance for Human Development (June 2011) 
still carries this view, institutionalized at the Bank since the World Development Report Making Services 
Work for the Poor (2004). 
57 Development practitioners typically translate the intrinsic value of participation as ‘empowerment’, but 
this term is used in the literature more to signal ‘opportunity’   or ‘choice’, while Alkire and Sen actually 
mean agency-achievement. Typical indicators used to evaluate empowerment are decision-making 
power, freedom of movement, among others. Constructive value refers to the possibility of value 
formation through participation, as an opportunity for citizens to learn from each other and form the 
value and priorities of a society. 
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decision-making is a good way to identify the starting point of the participatory program 
under analysis, and assess if the introduction of a thicker mode is possible in each 
context. In a more recent work, Crocker (2008) calls to ‘improve the democratic body 
along one or more of the dimensions of breadth, range, depth or control’.  
I.5 Participation and Local Governance  
Finally, even if participation can be adapted to respond and overcome context, the 
question remains if participation can or cannot change local governance processes and 
dynamics. Institutional and political context mediates (in a positive or negative manner) 
the impact of participation. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) are rather skeptic of 
development programs in general being able to break poor governance practices, while 
Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue that while good policy is affected by local politics, it 
can also create the incentives for good politics.  
Considering this, the study explores if providing El Alto citizens with more 
opportunities to voice their demands and concerns has altered in any way the 
organization and decision-making processes within the Municipality, and if the strategy 
has engaged other stakeholders that may see the process  as a threat to their own position 
of advantage in the community58. Instrumental for this analysis is recent literature on 
public sector reform, particularly Andrews’ (2009) framework for driving change in 
public administration and Malinga’s (2008) research on the role of ‘middle managers’ in 
public sector to understand incentives of municipal office managers. 
I.6  Organization of the Essay 
                                                           
58 On this point, see Selee (2012) for case studies in Mexico, where the parties pushing for more and 
better participatory mechanisms were the ones undermining them once their own party reached power. 
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Section I briefly introduced the research project and laid out the relevant 
literature. Section II features the national and local context in which the strategy was 
introduced. Section III features the evaluation framework and describes the data 
collected for the analysis. Section IV describes the empirical strategy and the 
introduction of theories of change and process mapping as elements of the evaluation to 
inform a redesign of the strategy and its evaluation; and Section V presents the results of 
the analysis.  Lastly, Section VI presents the conclusions and recommendations to 
improve the performance over time of El Alto’s participatory strategy.  
II. Citizen Participation in Peru, and the Context of El Alto, Piura 
II.1 Local participation and local government in Peru 
Native forms of participation in community affairs have existed in Peru for 
centuries, and some elements of them can still be observed in the life of many rural 
communities of the Andes and the Amazonia. However, the rapid urbanization process of 
the twentieth century, the internal conflict of the 1980s and the political centralism and 
authoritarianism of the Fujimori years in the 1990s shaped citizen relationships between 
and within communities, creating new spaces of heterogeneous actors for which no 
strong and inclusive social organization existed (Panfichi, ed. 2007; Remy, 2005).  
This context changed in the first years of the new millennia. As part of an effort 
from the State and civil society to promote reconciliation, decentralization and a closer 
relationship State-citizens, the Mesas de Concertación (Consensus Roundtables) first, 
and Participatory Budgeting later were introduced to foster decision-making processes 
that respond to local needs.  
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Participatory budgeting at the district and regional level in Peru is mandated by 
law59. A recent evaluation by The World Bank (2011) found encouraging facts around 
Peru’s participatory budgeting experience: notably, 36% of investment budget was 
allocated through the process by 2007. The same report, however, recognizes serious 
challenges to its sustainability: for example, by the same year, over 20% of 
Municipalities had not executed any project prioritized through participatory budgeting. 
Moreover, its impact has been limited because: a) only capital investment can be 
discussed (therefore excluding social expenditure by design) and b) it targets 
organizations, not individuals, in this way likely excluding most disadvantaged groups. In 
this particular point, McNulty (2012) questions the representativeness of participatory 
budgeting in Peru at the district level based on evidence that the most influential civil 
society organizations and government officials control the process60. 
Recent literature on participation in Peru has primarily focused on participatory 
budgeting and its potential to improve service delivery. However, one of the 
consequences of both participatory budgeting and the establishment of consensus 
roundtables has been repeatedly overlooked: the Municipality-led organization of 
neighborhood-based groups in participatory processes at the district level, particularly in 
urban areas of Peru61.  
                                                           
59 Peru’s Participatory Budget Law (Law 28056) was passed by Congress in 2003, and dictates that the 
capital investment costs of each regional, provincial, and local budget must be developed with civil society 
input. Following a series of steps—established by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)—
subnational governments must demonstrate that they have complied with this process in order to receive 
their annual budgets. 
60 The cited World Bank evaluation also describes how the costs of participation remain prohibitive in 
Peru, particularly in rural areas.  
61 In most rural districts, the consensus roundtables (Mesas de Concertación) have become one of the 
main channels to connect civil society and local government beyond the participatory budgeting process. 
In other rural areas, native participatory arrangements are still strong and have their own channels of 
communication with their local government. 
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Neighborhood Committees (Juntas Vecinales) and their meetings (Reuniones 
Vecinales) have existed in urban Peru at least since the 1960s (Schonwalder, 2002). 
Originally, they were spaces to coordinate citizen-based social action in the absence of a 
strong presence of local and national government. During the height of internal conflict in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, their role shifted to coordinating citizen security at the local 
level. In parallel, neighborhood-level leadership developed over the years along 
party/political movement lines.  
Only after the 2003 Law of Municipalities (Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades), 
neighborhood-based participation was formally linked to the concept of local 
government. As the law states: 
 
“Local governments are fundamental entities of the territorial organization of the State 
and immediate channels of neighborhood participation in public affairs, which 
institutionalize and manage with autonomy the particular interests of their corresponding 
community, with essential elements of local government the territory, population and 
organization”  
Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades N. 27972, Article I 
 
This formal link between local government and neighborhood-based participation 
has been followed by the creation or formalization of Neighborhood Participation Offices 
as part of the organigram of many Municipalities in Peru, and the design of new forms of 
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engagement with local residents, through participatory strategies. Such strategies share a 
number of characteristics62: 
i. Electoral origin, with candidates before municipal elections promising to establish 
or strengthen a participatory system, or incumbent Mayors thinking of how to 
connect with people before the following election. 
ii. Multiple interventions to increase the channels of communication between the 
Municipality and citizens, year round.  
iii. Rhetoric around participation at the individual-level, but in practice a strong 
reliance either on civil society organizations or established leadership as 
intermediaries, particularly in larger districts. 
 
II.2  Local participation in the context of El Alto -Piura 
The case study focuses on El Alto district in Piura, with around 7,000 inhabitants 
organized in 36 neighborhoods (only 30 of them recognized by the Municipality)63. What 
follows is a description of the context in which the participatory strategy was 
implemented. 
II.2.1.El Alto’s birth and development is closely related to its Oil and Fishing industries  
El Alto district is in the Talara province, Piura Region, in the north of Peru. Its 
history is closely linked to that of oil exploration in the country, with origins that go back 
                                                           
62 As already stated, there is very limited literature on local participatory processes in Peru beyond 
participatory budgeting. The characteristics laid out here are the result of interviews with officials in 
charge of the Municipality of Lima’s Neighbor Participation Office, the office of the Mayor in El Alto, Piura, 
interviews with local leaders, NGO representatives and discussions with academics. 
63 A similar retrospective analysis also funded by the Inter-American Development Bank was made for el 
Cercado de Lima (downtown Lima). That study can be found in a forthcoming book of the Inter-American 
Development Bank that presents eight case studies across Latin America. El Alto was selected for this 
essay because it allowed a more in-depth analysis thanks to the availability of socio-economic information 
from citizens attending neighborhood meetings. 
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to the 1920s, after a government concession to the British company Petrolera Lobitos 
Limited. The area received a constant influx of settlers to work in exploration and later 
extraction activities. The first neighborhoods (called barrios, some of them still existing 
nowadays) were formed along occupational lines. For example, Sanchez Cerro was 
residence to people selling liquor and food, and El Volante was home to the drivers of the 
oil company. Jobs were abundant and attracted people from different parts of the 
Peruvian north and beyond. During its times of affluence in the 1950s, the coastline of El 
Alto (Cabo Blanco, originally a very small fishermen village) became a vacation magnet 
for celebrities and millionaires from Europe and the United States. The confluence of the 
cold Humboldt Current and the warm waters near the Equator translates into an 
exceptional biological wealth.  
Figure 1. El Alto: Geographical location in the Region of Piura, Peru 
 
            Source: Plan Concertado de Desarrollo Distrito de El Alto 2012-2021 
Presently, the economic activity continues to gravitate around oil extraction and fishing. 
Petrobras (of Brazilian capital) and Savia (of Colombian-South Korean capital), lead oil 
extraction in El Alto and are key sources of employment and budget support (through oil 
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contributions, or canon). This economic structure, however, is expected to radically 
change. Savia and Petrobras have considerably reduced operations in the area, and a firm 
of Chinese capital will take over operations in 2015. There is also a lot of interest in 
fostering investment in the tourism sector, particularly around Cabo Blanco. While this 
transition takes place, the local government has become an important employer through 
investment in public works and maintenance, albeit jobs that are temporary and subject to 
availability of public resources. 
II.2.2 El Alto’s population is relatively homogenous 
As stated, 7,000 people live in El Alto divided in 30 recognized neighborhoods64. 
Size of the neighborhoods varies from 16 people in Los Jazmines to more than 600 
people in El Volante and Ciudad del Pescador. Extended family members tend to live in 
the same neighborhood or nearby, many with family names of original inhabitants of the 
area dedicated to fisheries or migrants of the 1920-1960 period. Immigration into El Alto 
is limited nowadays, but there is a transient population flow for seasonal work with the 
oil companies.  
Broadly speaking, neighborhoods share very similar demographic characteristics 
regardless of size (Figure 2). Smaller neighborhoods (under 100 inhabitants) have on 
average a younger population, more non-remunerated workers, and less people with 
college education.  
Figure 2. El Alto: Characteristics of Population by Size of Neighborhood (over and 
under 100 inhabitants) 
                                                           
64 In practical terms, recognition implies that the neighborhood meetings organized by a Neighborhood 
Committee are considered representative of a neighborhood’s population and their proceedings formally 




Source: Author’s calculations based on Population Census 2007. 
II.2.3 Limited social development, but low levels of poverty characterize El Alto 
The district of El Alto is comprised of 1,844 households. While 92% households 
have access to electricity, 35% of the population lives in households with no access to 
sanitation. Access to water, on the other hand, is virtually universal, with only 1% of 
households not having piped water; supply of water, however, is scarce.  Human 
development index for the area is 0.63, compared to 0.73 for the country, with a 4.2% 
poverty rate and low levels of malnutrition partially explained by a diet rich in nutrients 
from fish and seafood. Literacy reaches 93%, with 13% having technical school 
education and 7% a completed college education. In short, El Alto is not particularly poor 
in terms of socio-economic indicators, but its relatively highly educated inhabitants 
struggle to find stable and well-paid jobs.  
II.2.4 Lower investment in public works due to smaller oil contributions  
Resources from the oil canon have supported public investment in the area. Figure 
3 shows that, except the Cabo Blanco and Castro Pozo neighborhoods, public investment 
has been uniform vis-à-vis population distribution, mainly to build roads, sidewalks and 
water connection.  
 
 




      Source: Census Data and Municipality of El Alto records. 
In the last year of the previous administration (2010), S/. 17 million (roughly 
US$6 million) was invested in public works in the district. In three years of Mayor 
Zarate’s administration under study (2011-2013) a total of S/.33 million (or about US$12 
million) has been invested, for an average of S/. 11 million a year, reflecting a decline in 
contributions from oil companies. The composition of investment in public works also 
changed, with a predilection for road/sidewalk construction. Between January 2011 and 
December 2013, Mayor Zarate’s administration invested 92% of public works investment 
in roads/sidewalks, compared to 8% invested in services related to education, water or 
security65.  
II.2.5 El Alto features regular political conflict and challenges to Mayor’s legitimacy 
Because its natural resources and the access to oil contributions, El Alto is a 
coveted district with regular political conflict. Peru’s electoral law contemplates the 
possibility of Revocatoria processes against elected mayors, regional presidents and 
                                                           
65 To put this in perspective, the last year of the previous administration (2010), saw 26% public works 




elected magistrates66. The previous elected Mayor was voted out from office through a 
Revocatoria in 2009.  A year later the current Mayor, Juan Zarate, was elected under an 
electoral platform that promised a renewed relationship between the local government 
and the people of El Alto. Then, in 2012, the administration of Mayor Zarate also faced a 
Revocatoria process, but survived the challenge67.  
II.2.6 The new participatory strategy is detached from existing channels of engagement 
The participatory strategy unfolded after Mayor Zarate took office in early 2011. 
However, before the strategy was introduced, there were already in place two channels 
for gathering citizen feedback and identify citizen demands: la Mesa de Partes and the 
Participatory Budgeting process. It is quite indicative that neither channel was considered 
as part of the participatory strategy of the new Administration68, and that both are 
managed by municipal offices different to the one in charge of the strategy.  
                                                           
66 Revocatoria, a legal process similar to the impeachment, is one of the direct democracy instruments 
introduced in Peru’s 1993 Constitution together with referendum, popular initiatives and demands for 
accountability. It is a procedure that has been increasingly used in the last few years. In 2012, 260 districts 
of Peru (out of a total 1,789 districts, or 14.5%) went through this process, with 69 Mayors (26% of 
districts undergoing revocation) losing their jobs after the new election. Critics point out that while a 
legitimate instrument, revocatorias in Peru do not feature ample deliberation to discuss and justify their 
application, and they only require enough signatures that can be collected and presented even by an 
individual citizen. The incumbent mayor or regional president cannot advertise his/her work during the 
process. There is a perception that these processes are tools for political revenge at the local level 
(Kresalja, 2012), a debate that intensified only after the Mayor of Lima, the capital and largest city in the 
country was subjected to a revocation process in 2012. 
67 The story behind this is a good example of the misuse of the revocation process. After the vote, local 
press reported that the person promoting the revocation of Mayor Zarate’s mandate was his predecessor, 
former Mayor Rosa Machuca, who lost the 2009 Revocatoria vote. At that time, she was accused of a 
number of irregularities, but never sentenced. After leaving her post as Mayor she moved to the 
provincial capital, Talara to become Manager of the Human Development Office of the Municipality of 
Talara. She was removed from this office only after her participation in the process against Mayor Zarate 
was confirmed (Diario Virtual de Talara, November and December 2012). 
68 In particular, there is no coordination between participatory budgeting and neighborhood meetings 




i. Mesa de Partes. Residents can make requests to the municipal government 
through a letter to the Municipal Manager Office delivered in person at City Hall. 
There were 420 such requests between January 2011 and December 2013: 30% 
are related to employment opportunities, 18% requests for meeting municipal 
managers, 15% information requests, and among the rest, only a few are related to 
neighborhood problems such as safety, neighborhood upkeep, or land (either 
delimitation or use of it)69.   
ii. Participatory Budgeting. As is common practice in Peru, the process is led by the 
local Budget and Planning Office (GDP). In most districts of Peru there is 
deliberation among neighborhood participants proposing projects for the year to 
come, and then local authorities prepare investment profiles to be cleared by the 
Ministry of Economics and Finance regional office; however, in El Alto, under 
the argument of accelerating the process, the Budget and Planning Office prepares 
public works files considered priorities by the Municipality and then subjects 
those files to vote among neighbors for prioritization70. The participatory 
budgeting process of El Alto is therefore not deliberative, and it can be argued 
that not quite representative either, as citizen priorities are not discussed 
beforehand. Further, although neighborhood attendance during the participatory 
budgeting process increased from 30 people in 2011 to 75 in 2013, this still 
                                                           
69 In a context of increasing demand for job opportunities, neighbors of El Alto regularly push the 
Municipality to negotiate with the oil companies in the area for higher quotas in local labor. The local 
government also hires temporary labor for public works. Over time, the SPV has become an intermediary 
between neighbors and the Municipality, channeling job offers and collecting information on workers in 
the district. 
70 Apparently, this process for Participatory Budgeting was established after serious delays in the first 
couple of years of its implementation attributed to the original deliberative practice (Source: interview 
with GDP Manager).  
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represents barely 1% of El Alto’s population71, compared to an average 3% 
nationwide. During the 2011-2013 period, neighborhood representatives attending 
participatory budgeting meetings averaged 14 years of education and were 55 
years old on average. 
III. Evaluation Framework 
III.1 Strategy as a special unit of analysis for evaluation 
“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” 
Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965) 
There is a reason why there is still so little in the development economics 
literature on how to evaluate strategies. Evaluators are used to have as unit of analysis 
either interventions or theories of change. Patrizi and Quinn Patton (2010) postulate the 
evaluation of a strategy as a different dimension of the evaluation problem. In general, a 
strategy is defined as “about where an organization is headed and how it intends to get 
there” (Patrizi, 2010). 
Mintzberg (2007) underscores that in evaluating strategies, the researcher should 
not focus on what was planned but in what actually happened during execution. In fact, 
strategy evaluation typically expects that some of what is planned will go unrealized, 
some will be implemented roughly as expected, and some new elements will emerge 
during implementation. The standard approach to evaluation, in contrast, is based on 
accountability, where program results are judged based on what was originally planned in 
terms of actions and intended outcomes. Figure 4 presents a representation of the subject 
of strategy evaluation. 
                                                           
71 In fact, recent reports indicate a reduction of 15% in participation during the budgeting process for 
2014 compared to a year earlier. 
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Figure 4. An evaluation framework for tracking Strategy 
 
Source: Quinn Patton and Patrizi (2010), adaptation of Mintzberg (2007) 
 
In fact, Mintzberg claims that any strategy is one or more of four Ps: a plan, a 
perspective, a position, or a pattern72. I argue that the story of how the participatory 
strategy of El Alto came to be combines elements of a perspective and a pattern. While a 
perspective reflects internal drivers and preferences on how things should be done, a 
pattern arises when an organization learns from what worked (or not) in the past to guide 
future action. 
III.2 Research questions 
The nature of the strategy matters to determine the questions that the evaluation 
needs to answer and the tools to be used. Thus, to evaluate a strategy that is defined by 
perspective and patterns the analysis should assess the consistency of stakeholder 
behavior over time, understanding how the perspective changes or is adapted during 
                                                           
72 Previous work by Mintzberg (2005) referred to Strategy as 5P’s, with the fifth one being Ploy, and the 
use of tools such as game theory instrumental to build this type of strategy. Ploy has been absorbed as a 
Plan in more recent versions. 
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implementation (Mintzberg (2007), based on previous work by Simon (1957)). Tracking 
behavior can lead to important baseline observations—about actions, values, practices, 
processes, structures, competencies, networks, and beliefs—that can guide a strategy 
constructively. In order to do this, data for patterning should be as tangible as possible 
(Patrizi, 2010).  
Adapting Patrizi (2010) and Wehipeihana and Davidson’s (2010) guidelines for 
the evaluation of strategies as perspectives and patterns, the following are the evaluation 
questions posed in the analysis: 
A. On the Overall Strategy 
i. What is the organization’s strategic perspective? 
ii. What aspects of the intended strategy were implemented as planned?  
iii. What planned elements of the strategy were dropped? Why? 
iv. What unplanned/emergent strategies were implemented? Why? How? 
B. On the interventions used to implement the Strategy 
i. What is the value of a particular policy initiative as a contributor to 
strategic policy outcomes? 
ii. How well does each initiative fit with and complement the other initiatives 
that make up the strategic policy mix? 
iii. What is the collective value of the suite of initiatives to achieve a 
particular strategic outcome? 
III.3 Participatory Strategy of El Alto and its Objectives 
One of the first striking elements observed by the research team was the gap 
between the objectives of the participatory strategy as promised by Mayor Zarate during 
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the electoral campaign (and later the 2012-2021 Development Plan for El Alto); and the 
outcomes the Municipality requested to be measured through the evaluation. The 
Municipal administration had participation at the center of its Government Plan as an 
instrument for citizen empowerment and improving service delivery; but the evaluation 
request was limited to assess if the strategy had or not increased the number of citizens 
attending neighborhood meetings, with particular interest in attendance of youth living in 
El Alto.   
The reason for this limited ambition was the lack of information available on 
higher level outcomes, and as it will be argued in a moment, a view of participation 
limited to the demand side, without an introspection of the Municipalities’ own systems 
and response mechanisms. Implicitly, the strategy assumed that offering more spaces for 
participation and having as many citizens as possible using those spaces would be 
guarantee achieving the intrinsic and the instrumental values of participation. 
Another concern for the evaluation team after a first look at the strategy was how 
its components had been designed. Interviews with the Mayor and office managers at the 
Municipality revealed how when Mayor Zarate took office there was no clear idea of 
what the participatory strategy would entail. After a few months the participatory strategy 
of El Alto took shape as a set of four interventions (called pillars by El Alto officials): 
i. Increase in the frequency of neighborhood meetings. This entails more than just 
having more meetings: it demands deploying personnel from the Neighborhood 
Participation Sub-Office more often, and local leadership and citizens allocating 
more of their time to discussions. 
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ii. Systematization of proceedings from neighborhood meetings (Tramite 
Documentario, or TRADOC). Traditionally, content of meetings was only 
registered and kept by the Neighborhood Committee. El Alto has progressively 
moved towards generating for each meeting a Summary of issues and demands 
raised by citizens that could be referenced and sent to the Municipality.  
iii. Presence of the Mayor in neighborhood meetings. Introduced to increase the 
opportunities of direct contact of the Mayor with the population, and improve 
coordination with neighborhood residents. The plan was to schedule his presence 
so all neighborhoods would be visited by him at some point every year.  
iv. Third-Party monitored election of Neighborhood Committees’ members. In the 
past, election of Neighborhood Committees was not mandatory and when it 
happened, it was managed by the incumbent members in each neighborhood. The 
election of representatives through regular third-party monitored elections was 
conceived during the first few months of 2011, but only took place in September 
201373. Three representatives for each of the 30 neighborhoods were then elected 
and among them, three were elected by their peers to represent all Neighborhood 
Committees at the El Alto Municipality and Council. 
III.4 Data 
A research team of four travelled to El Alto three times for extended stays 
collecting and systematizing data during 2013. Coordination with the Sub-Office of 
Neighbor Participation (SPV) allowed for continued data collection in between visits. 
The focus of data collection was in the following areas: 
                                                           
73 Information collected during interviews and unofficial discussions speaks of the support given by some 
of the exiting leaders to the Revocatoria process against Mayor Zarate. Neighborhood committees were 
typically dominated by a handful of families and had not changed in many years. 
119 
 
i. Neighborhood-level information: using 2007 Census data, aggregate 
socioeconomic data was generated to have a profile of each of the 30 
recognized neighborhoods, including population and unsatisfied basic needs 
indicators. 
ii. Neighborhood meeting records: Only a limited number of meeting records had 
been filed with the Municipality and reports from facilitators were typically 
very generic. We collected and photocopied Minutes and facilitator reports 
from all 294 neighborhood meetings since January 2010 to December 2013, 
classifying them based on the topics discussed and gathering information on 
attendance The file generated has been shared with the Municipality and this 
tracking will continue for their internal monitoring. 
iii. Observation and qualitative analysis of meetings. A total of 12 neighborhood 
meetings in 8 different neighborhoods large and small were attended by the 
research team during 2013. We attended and observed meeting dynamics, the 
extent to which the agenda was followed, other topics raised by attendants, 
number of people present, registration process, and informally talked to 
neighborhood participants about how they heard about the meeting and what 
topics they wished had been discussed. 
iv. Socio-economic information on attendants. Even before the current 
administration, the attendance of citizens to the meetings was recorded by 
getting their national identification number (DNI)74. We requested the 
Municipality to provide the latest census data of the El Alto inhabitants by 
                                                           
74 When inquired about this, the SPV Manager said they simply continued a practice already in place 




DNI but without names, and that list was matched to the attendance records75. 
Matching records were generated for 1,086 (60%) out of 1,819 different 
people attending neighborhood meetings between January 2010 and 
December 2013. The remainder 40% could not be matched either because the 
DNI provided had missing/wrong numbers, or because the people involved 
did not have DNI at the time of the Census.  
v. Information on public works investment in el Alto 2010-2013. Appendix 1 
presents the list of public works that took place in El Alto between 2010-2013 
including the budget assigned to each, begin and end date, and the 
neighborhoods benefitted. The information on public works was coded and 
matched to a database with information on meetings and on attendants, so the 
analysis could identify what public works were being executed when a 
meeting took place in a given neighborhood. Notice, however, that the public 
works records do not include other more routine actions by the Municipality 
such as city beautification. Records requested to the Community Services 
Office on the latter were incomplete and unreliable, so they are not considered 
in this analysis. 
vi. Semi-structured interviews76 with municipal authorities and focus group with 
neighborhood facilitators. 
 
                                                           
75 To protect the privacy of meeting attendants, DNI numbers were replaced by unique identifiers before 
analysis was produced. 
76 People interviewed at the Municipality were: Mayor Juan Zarate, Municipal Manager Ernesto Coronado, 
Social Development Manager Teresa Risco, Neighbor Participation Sub-Office Manager Cinthia 
Yamunaque, Planning and Budget Manager Darwin Quinde, Urban Development Manager Denis 
Tantajulca, Communal Services Manager Eduardo Tenque. 
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IV. Empirical Strategy and Theory of Change 
The evaluation undertaken in El Alto is retrospective: it attempts to assess the 
effectiveness of the overall strategy three years into its implementation. The Municipality 
of El Alto received no technical assistance for intervention design, or in deciding the 
objectives and indicators attached to the strategy.  
This research turns a retrospective evaluation into an opportunity to apply realistic 
evaluation and provide recommendations to improve the strategy’s design and future 
evaluation. 
Thus, the research is structured in four parts: the evaluation of the attendance 
objectives set by the Municipality; the evaluation of the strategy’s implementation; the 
comparison of the assumed theory of change behind the strategy to what is actually 
happening in El Alto; and a proposed evaluation framework that introduces 
experimentation to test complementary interventions informed by context. Every element 
of the research employs qualitative methods, complemented by quantitative methods 
whenever data availability allows for it. 
IV.1 Evaluation of Immediate Objectives   
As indicated, the Municipality of El Alto was interested in assessing if the 
participatory strategy launched in 2011 had or not increased attendance to neighborhood 
meetings, particularly of young people. Interviews with Municipal officers indicate a 
common assumption that attracting more people to the meetings would automatically 
lead to the empowerment of citizens. The analysis looks at the trends, the drivers of 
attendance, and explores how sustainable attendance is in the near future given the 
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current strategy setup, all within the parameters allowed by the very limited data 
available.   
For simplicity in interpreting results, a better understanding of magnitudes of 
effects and comparability across sets of results, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions 
are employed77. In each set, regressions are run for the overall period of implementation, 
and for before, during and after the Revocatoria period (January-September 2012). The 
period before the Revocatoria has a relatively low number of observations, so the results 
for this period must be taken just as indicative78.  
The effect of Mayor’s presence in the meeting, any ongoing infrastructure project 
in the neighborhood, the timing of the meeting (before or after the election of 
Neighborhood Committees)79, and the topics discussed during the meeting are included 
as dummy variables to explain attendance to each meeting and average age in the January 
2011-December 2013 period. In the case of attendance, neighborhood population size is 
also included as a control variable80.  
        (1) 
    (2) 
                                                           
77 Alternative methods were considered, particularly Instrumental Variables that are frequently used in 
the literature to deal with potential measurement error and simultaneity. However, it was judged that 
even using this method, the limited information available on the meetings and relatively small samples 
did not guarantee that the IV method would produce better results. If there is a better IV that should be 
used then the estimates are not efficient; and IV estimates are biased in small samples, in the same 
direction as OLS.  
78 Low number of observations in an OLS regression affects the degrees of freedom of the estimation 
process, with resulting estimates biased. 
79 The dummy takes the value of 1 if the meeting took place after the JUVECO election, 0 otherwise. 
80 Population is not included as control in the Average Age regression given the homogeneous distribution 
of ages across neighborhoods, regardless of size. 
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Notice that only two components of the strategy are considered in the models. The 
regressions are at the meeting level so it makes no sense to include number of meetings; 
while there were not enough observations of TRADOC (the filing of meeting 
proceedings) across the sample81. RoadWorks and Topic are used to explore potential 
drivers of attendance independent of the strategy components82.  
IV.2 Evaluation of Strategy’s Implementation 
 Looking at the data for the analysis of attendance to meetings, it was clear that 
implementation of the four components of the strategy was not evenly accomplished, or 
even purposely sequenced, over time. Only towards the very end of the period of analysis 
the four components were fully in place. Implementation evaluation focuses on how the 
introduction of interventions that constitute the strategy was influenced by context, 
examining changes to the intended strategy over time and across neighborhoods. 
The semi-structured interviews explore the circumstances that motivated the 
selection of participation as a key strategy for municipal government and the changes in 
scope, priority and behavior patterns of key actors. Following the research questions 
proposed, interviews aimed at: 
i. Understanding of the rationale and scope of the participatory strategy 
ii. Documenting changes in the menu of interventions during strategy 
implementation 
                                                           
81 There is a serious imbalance in the distribution of TRADOC observations over the period analyzed, 
particularly before and during the Revocatoria process. This will be explained in the implementation 
evaluation section. 
82 The topic ‘Infrastructure’ is excluded from the Topic matrix due to its high correlation with having 
RoadWorks active in the neighborhood. It must be noted that RoadWorks and Topic may drive Mayor’s 
presence in a meeting, something that is explored in the implementation evaluation section too. 
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iii. Identifying context-related challenges in implementation, particularly if 
they were motivated by budget constraints, resistance of organized 
neighbors or internal coordination programs.  
iv. Determining the level of alignment of internal and external actors to the 
overall strategy, given citizens’ incentives and alternative channels of 
participation. 
v. Identifying patterns in the behavior of local government employees in 
terms of implementing the different interventions, or in scheduling public 
works and other local government activities over the study period.  
Next, regressions are run for two of the strategy components, using OLS for the 
same reasons as exposed above, while the implementation of the other two strategy 
components is analyzed qualitatively given their nature.  
i. Organization of Neighborhood Meetings 
Finding what determined the pattern of neighborhood meeting organization 
between 2011 and 2013 is quite challenging, as municipal officers differ in their 
assessment of it. The only pieces of information available, besides the record of a 
meeting occurring, are the list of concurrent public works of the Municipality, the timing 
of the meeting (before, during or after Revocatoria), and of course the neighborhood 
where the meeting took place.  
However, the limited number of months (36) in which to group meetings and the 
variation across neighborhoods means likely biased estimates in a regression analysis 
setting. Thus, a basic correlation analysis between meetings and public works is 
presented just to identify change in patterns over time. 
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ii. Mayor’s presence at meetings 
The reasoning behind having the Mayor attend meetings is to increase the 
credibility of the strategy, but also the visibility of the Mayor as the person promoting 
more opportunities for participation. Since the Mayor has limited time to attend meetings 
given competing priorities, the analysis tries to determine if the selection of the meetings 
he did attend is based on the size of the neighborhood, the topics on agenda, or ongoing 
public works. Thus: 
  (3) 
where  the attendance of the Mayor at a meeting is a function of population in the 
neighborhood based on the 2007 Census data, having ongoing infrastructure projects in 
the neighborhood at the time of the meeting (RoadWorks83) and the topics discussed in 
the meeting: Jobs, Representation, Others (mainly security and beautification)84. Analysis 
is clustered at the neighborhood level.  
iii. Filing Meeting Proceedings (TRADOC) 
This component was first introduced as a suggestion made to neighborhood committees 
and facilitators, and only in November 2013 it was turned into a mandatory requirement. 
Patterns in the implementation of this component are explored before it became 
mandatory. The analysis explores if filing was more likely or not based on Mayor’s 
presence at the meeting, size and gender composition of the audience, socio-economic 
                                                           
83 There 22 infrastructure projects in El Alto that started between January 2011 and December 2013. Only 
3 of them are not related to roads, traffic or sidewalks: 2 projects are of educational infrastructure and 1 
of water access infrastructure. Two of these three projects benefitted the entire district, so cannot be 
attached to a single neighborhood. Hence the characterization of infrastructure projects as road works in 
the model.   
84 Notice that these dummies are not exclusive: in the same meeting two or more topics can be discussed. 
The dummy Others excludes infrastructure as a topic, since the latter is highly correlated with RoadWorks.  
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status of attendants (based access to sanitation, housing status, and roof materials), 
ongoing road works in the neighborhood and the agenda of the meeting.   
   (4) 
where TRADOC is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if Minutes were filed in the 
Municipality, 0 otherwise; Mayor is a dummy with value 1 if the mayor attended that 
meeting, 0 otherwise; Attendance is expressed in numbers, PercWomen as proportion of 
women present in meeting and RoadWorks has already been explained. SocioEc85 is a 
matrix of variables linked to average socioeconomic conditions of attendants, and Topic 
another matrix for the different themes than can be discussed.  
 
iv. Neighborhood Committees Election 
 The fourth component of the strategy, the Neighborhood Committee Election, is a 
one-time event so a regression to explain it is not warranted. The qualitative analysis, 
however, will provide some insights on its timing; the component will also be considered 
as a control to explore any structural change for variables explored in the regression 
models that are linked to it. 
IV.3 Theory of Change and Process Mapping  
 As discussed, a strategy evaluation framework emphasizes not the intended 
strategy, but the realized strategy. The analysis of attendance and of implementation 
facilitates the identification of key elements of context that shape the strategy and its 
                                                           
85 One precision that must be made about SocioEc is that while it could be expected to have a meeting 
attendance composition that follows the one of the neighborhood, the idea is precisely to allow for a 




results over time. Based on this information, I construct the Context-Mechanism-
Outcome (C-M-O) hypothesis (as featured in Westhorp, 2014) behind the participatory 
strategy of El Alto, describing both the assumptions of Mayor Zarate and his team when 
they designed the strategy and what actually happened once the strategy was 
implemented. Figure 5 features the basic C-M-O hypothesis with its focus on institutional 
settings and the mechanisms triggered by the intervention (the strategy) on the ecosystem 
(El Alto’s social interactions), organization (Municipality), and participating agents 
(citizens, community leaders, private sector, the Mayor, among others). 
Figure 5. The Context – Mechanism – Outcome (CMO) Hypothesis 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualization 
 
The nature of a strategy – a set of interventions pursuing the same objectives- 
demands a more detailed look at how its components complement each other. By 
mapping the participatory process of El Alto, it is possible to identify elements of the 
strategy that are currently missing or incomplete, so the recommendations can go beyond 
answering if the strategy is or not working, but how it could work better.    
The process map featured here is the same one used by the research team in 
discussions with the Municipality of El Alto, and it proved to be a useful way to frame 
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the discussion. It represents any participatory development process as a ‘funnel’ with 
holes on it86: the role of a participatory strategy is to expand the wide end of the funnel 
(increased and more representative participation), repair the holes (minimizing the loss of 
information), and improve the flow in the narrow end of the funnel (improving internal 
systems and executing with consideration of information provided). The specific 
components of El Alto’s strategy will be mapped along the funnel and missing elements 
identified.  
 Figure 6. Mapping the Participatory Development Strategy 
 
          Source: Author’s conceptualization of Participatory Strategy 
This framework responds to calls by authors such as Imae et al. (2011) and 
Deaton (2010) to avoid a “black box” approach to causality, focusing in the internal 
                                                           
86 This is an adaptation of the ‘funnel of causality’ model for decision making commonly used in political 
science, with an institutional constraints approach.  
129 
 
dynamics of the program being analyzed to explain “how” causal relationships within the 
system arise.  
IV.4 Informing strategy improvements, and the evaluation of them  
Based on the evaluation of objectives, the evaluation of implementation, the 
framing of the C-M-O Hypothesis, and the process mapping, the research proposes 
supplementary interventions to strengthen the participatory strategy of El Alto to be 
piloted, and an evaluation plan for the new components, including alternative outcome 
indicators that can be tracked through a revamped M&E system that is fed through 
administrative data87.  
V.  Results of the analysis 
V.1 Evaluation of Immediate Objectives 
Table 1 presents the results for the short term objective set up by the 
Municipality: attracting more people to neighborhood meetings, particularly youth. After 
controlling for the population size of each neighborhood, and considering the overall 
period, attendance seems to have been driven by having employment on the agenda of the 
meeting, while attendance at meetings held after the neighborhood committee election of 
November 2013 seems to be consistently lower, which may be a temporary effect due to 
saturation of neighborhood activities during the period leading to the election. 
 
                                                           




The table also looks at drivers of average age among attendants. The analysis 
indicates that Mayor’s presence in meetings actually drives average age up, while no 
significant effect is registered after the committee elections. In terms of topics on the 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The determinants of attendance, however, look very different during the time of 
political noise due to the Revocatoria (Jan-Sept. 2012): social and representation issues in 
the agenda drive attendance, as does the ongoing implementation of public works in the 
neighborhood. Mayor’s presence seems to influence attendance only after the 
Revocatoria process.  
The numbers give an idea of how our assessment of the strategy varies based on 
the period of time considered. Figure 7 shows that compared to the last year of the 
previous administration (2010), the average attendance to neighborhood meetings has, in 
fact, decreased during Mayor Zarate’s tenure. However, this is not unexpected: meetings 
are no longer rare events held only in the larger neighborhoods. As part of the strategy, 
meetings are now more common, and cover most neighborhoods of El Alto, large and 
small. After the Revocatoria (September 2012), attendance seems stabilized at between 
20-30 people attending each meeting on average. 
The larger number of meetings, however, meant a larger number of people of El 
Alto attending (Figure 8). One claim that the administration can make is that 1,758 
different people (38% of all adults in El Alto) have attended at least one neighborhood 
meeting between January 2011 and December 2013. This also indicates interest among El 






Figure 7. El Alto: Average Meeting Attendance by Month 
 
                    Source: Neighborhood Committees’ records, author’s calculations  
Figure 8. El Alto: Total Attendance to Neighborhood Meetings per Month 
 





Table 2. El Alto: Characteristics of People Attending Neighborhood Meetings 
Demographics Value   Attended a Meeting that discussed: % 
Female (%) 58   social issues 13 
Age 42   infrastructure 35 
Years of Education 10   Jobs 33 
Household Size 4.6   representation 35 
Average Attendant… Characteristic   Attended Meeting: % 
Occupation Not in Labor Force   with Mayor present 27 
Housing arrangement Own dwelling, no title   while road works ongoing 48 
Roof material Plank, metal   in 2013 57 
Sanitation arrangement Some access   more than once 48 
    Source: Neighborhood committees’ records 
Some characteristics of the average person attending these meetings between 
January 2011 and December 2013 are described in Table 3: female, over 40, educated, 
with access to services, outside the labor force. In terms of participation, it is indicative 
that 52% have only been to one meeting, 43% attended their last meeting in 2012, and 
73% of people participating have not been present in a neighborhood meeting with the 
Mayor present.  
In the case of average age, no element of the strategy was specifically tailored to 
attract young people: the assumption was that increasing the mere spaces of participation 
would attract more people in this age bracket. Figure 9 shows that the strategy of 
increasing the number of meetings to increase younger turnout has worked, but only to 
certain extent. While the average age of neighborhood participants in meetings has 
steadily declined since 2010, the largest effect was registered in the first year of the 
strategy, when more frequent neighborhood meetings were a novelty in the community. 





Figure 9. El Alto: Average Age of Neighborhood Meeting Attendants 
 
                         Source: Neighborhood committees’ records, author’s calculations 
In conclusion, the increase in number of meetings (first component of the 
strategy) and the effort to hold meetings across neighborhoods in the period 2011-2013 
has paid off in terms of attendance and average age. This was expected, given the very 
limited access citizens of El Alto had before to direct engagement and discussion with 
representatives of their Municipal Government. From the perspective of the 
Municipality, this element of the reform meant a significant mass of voters that could be 
engaged year-round, which was particularly helpful during the Revocatoria process. 
However, the impact of increasing number of meetings has slowed down as they 
are less of a novelty and there is no systematic response to citizen feedback provided 
during the meetings. 
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The analysis also makes clear a lack of connection between other interventions in 
the strategy and the objectives set by the Municipality. First, the Mayor’s presence 
(second component of the strategy) has not been a driver of attendance in the overall 
period and in fact, it seems to attract older instead of younger people. While it can be 
argued that it is too soon to see any effect from the filing of meeting proceedings (third 
component of the strategy), this element is unlikely to have an effect on attendance if it is 
not complemented with response mechanisms to the information that reaches the 
Municipality. In other words, the promise that filing meeting Minutes carries from the 
authority receiving a concern is irrelevant if over time there is no visible action from the 
Municipality’s side. Finally, the election of neighborhood committees (fourth component 
of the strategy) assumed that increased legitimacy of representatives would attract more 
people to neighborhood meetings; however, the election of the same leaders in most 
neighborhoods indicates that either legitimacy was not a problem, or that there is a lack 
of viable alternatives to existing leadership.     
V.2 Evaluation of Strategy’ Implementation 
V.2.1 Perspective vs. Patterns: From Intended to Realized Participation Strategy88 
During the 2010 election campaign, Mayor Zarate and his team included in their 
Government Plan for the district the promise of ‘increasing local participation in local 
decision making for a more inclusive El Alto’ (Plan de Gobierno Distrito de El Alto -
APRA, Elecciones Municipales 2010). Interviews with Mayor Zarate and collaborators 
                                                           




during his campaign, who are now part of the Administration, reveal that the idea was 
motivated by: 
i. Discussions with people of El Alto revealing frustration with the way the 
municipality handles their demands and requests. People living in smaller 
neighborhoods, in particular, did not have regular meetings, and when 
there was one, follow up of issues was quite limited; 
ii. A perceived lack of trust from the population in local authorities, 
particularly after the Revocatoria process lost by the previous Mayor, 
accused of improper use of public funds;  
iii. A sense of political instability, and the need to improve the relationship of 
Mayor with citizens throughout the term in office. Two of the previous 
three Mayors had been through processes to vacate their offices supported 
by Mayor Zarate’s political party (APRA, so the Mayor’s team feared 
retribution.   
iv. The concentration of Neighborhood leadership among families with larger 
power or networks in their area, which do not necessarily represent the 
wider population in each neighborhood. 
Thus, while formally justified in a rhetoric of citizen empowerment during the 
campaign, the design of the participatory strategy was strongly guided by political 
considerations: government stability, building the Mayor’s relationship with citizens 
beyond the election, and weakening potential opposition. This is reflected in the selection 
of indicators of success tracked by the Municipality: attendance and average age of 
attendants. While the original justification of participation was heavy on empowerment 
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arguments, the behavior pattern of municipal officers and staff during implementation, 
particularly during the Revocatoria process (January-September 2012) indicates a 
dominance of the political angle of the strategy.  
V.2.2. Alignment of different players to the Perspective89   
 A.  Internal Actors (Municipality) 90 
Municipal managers interviewed confirmed their full support of the Mayor’s 
participatory strategy. However, they face competing demands and restrictions that 
complicate a stronger commitment to participation in day to day operations. Below is an 
analysis of how the most important players in the implementation of the strategy interact, 
and how engaged they are in the strategy. 
 
i. Office of Social Development (OSD). The Sub-Office of Neighborhood 
Participation (SPV) of this department organizes neighborhood meetings. 
It receives requests from citizens at neighborhood meetings, redirecting 
them either to other municipal offices or to private sector companies when 
they are employment-related. However, its capacity of response to citizen 
demands is very limited. It does not manage any resources linked to 
infrastructure, and since El Alto receives income through mining 
                                                           
89 Section based on information from interviews with municipal office and sub-office managers and 
representatives of Neighborhood Committees. 
90 It must be noted that participation was not the only priority for the new Municipal government in 2011, 
and attention to implementation of the strategy varied over time. The key to the administration’s success 
was the access to resources and jobs provided by the oil companies in the area: in this sense lower oil 
prices have translated in less contributions to local authorities in the past few years; on top of that, 
Petrobras and Savia had already announced in late 2011 that they were likely to sell their operation in El 
Alto in 2015. This is the context that the different players of the participatory process navigate. 
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contributions, the district is not eligible for State allocations for social 
programs. Therefore, projects that OSD would like to undertake in areas 
such as health and education are often stalled. 
ii. Office of Planning and Budget (OPB). Manages the participatory 
budgeting (PB) process. It has a larger budget so it can announce PB 
meetings through media and provide incentives to residents for their 
participation. Its work is not coordinated with SPV. In fact, the OPB 
manager reported that response to citizen requests channeled through SPV 
is not in its mandate. OPB focuses in capital investment priorities under 
the Ministry of Finance guidelines and those agreed through participatory 
budgeting. 
iii. Office of Urban Development (OUD). In charge of responding to citizen 
requests for infrastructure and maintenance. Only an executing role, so no 
direct outreach to the population. OUD reports overwhelming requests: 
besides projects approved through participatory budgeting, it executes 
other infrastructure projects discussed and approved through the Mayor’s 
office and the municipal council.  
iv. Office of Community Services (OCS). Receives the most demands 
involving cleaning, safety, trading, environment and traffic. Response to 
demands depends on budget, order in which the demand was received, or 
priorities established by the Mayor’s office or the Council.  
B.  External Actors 
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In general, El Alto shows very limited alignment of neighborhood representatives 
and private sector with the participatory strategy. 
i. Neighborhood Committees and the citizens of El Alto. The Committees 
can call the population for other meetings than those sponsored by the 
Municipality if deemed convenient, and may resolve some basic disputes 
and demands within their neighborhood. Some of the larger Committees, 
like the one in Cabo Blanco, have their own resources from business 
activities in the area allowing them to have an annual budget for 
immediate actions in the neighborhood. There is a sense among office 
managers at the Municipality that Committees are not very active in 
spreading the word about meetings with the Municipality’s facilitators, 
something that was confirmed during the field visits. Besides, even after 
an increase in the number of meetings with the Municipality, a large 
number of requests from individual citizens or Committees was still 
channeled through Mesa de Partes in the 2011-2013 period. 
ii. Oil and other private sector companies of El Alto.  A reported perverse 
consequence of the restrictions for social spending at the Municipality of 
El Alto is that many Neighborhood Committees maintain the practice of 
directly contacting the oil companies for assistance. The oil companies 
have reinforced this practice by having their own meetings and activities 
with the Committees, in a very ad hoc manner.      
The analysis of alignment of key players in the participatory strategy indicates 
that within the Municipality, there is a lack of identification with the process of most 
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municipal offices beyond the Sub-Office of Neighborhood Participation. Most offices 
lack a mandate to collaborate and coordinate with SPV the strategy’s implementation and 
even less to establish response mechanisms for citizen requests. Moreover, the Mayor’s 
Office and the Council have not modified the internal structure of the Municipality to be 
more responsive to participatory processes, and failed at providing adequate budget for 
implementation during the first two years.  
The strategy’s impact has also been restricted by the lack of engagement of 
players outside the Municipality, in particular the Neighborhood Committees and private 
sector companies.  
V.2.3 How the Municipality increased the number of meetings   
The organization of a meeting starts with a request of members of a neighborhood 
or by initiative of the Municipality to discuss topics of interest such as participatory 
budgeting projects, jobs, or safety. In practice, it is the Municipality that typically reaches 
out to the Neighborhood Committees to organize meetings and listen to the population.  
Meetings attended by the research team had always the same format: a presentation by a 
Municipality facilitator on latest developments in the district, and then open floor for 
residents to express their opinion or concerns.   
Figure 10 shows implementation of the different components of the strategy over 







Figure 10. El Alto: Participatory Strategy’ Timeline based on Actual 
Implementation (January 2010- December 2013) 
 
    Source: Author, based on diverse Municipality of El Alto records and interviews   
Organizing more meetings has associated costs, from mobilizing facilitators and 
meeting preparation to the provision of snacks and refreshments to people attending.  The 
lack of budget for the incremental cost associated was reflected in a slow start in 
implementation. In 2010, the last year of the previous administration, the Municipality 
organized only 19 meetings in 2 neighborhoods: Divino Nino (3) and Cabo Blanco (16). 
During the first year of the new Administration (2011), 46 meetings were organized in 8 
neighborhoods, even though there were no meetings during the first three months. 
According to the Sub-Office of Neighborhood Participation, the initial selection of new 
142 
 
neighborhoods was opportunistic: larger neighborhood were prioritized, but also 
neighborhoods where leadership was willing to share organization expenses.  
In 2012 and 2013, with a larger budget assigned, the Sub-Office of Neighborhood 
Participation, organized 115 meetings each year. The increase however, has not been 
evenly distributed over time or across neighborhoods. Thus, over a third of 2012 
meetings (40) took place within a month before the Revocatoria election, and while in 
2012 those 115 meetings were distributed across 11 neighborhoods (37% coverage), in 
2013 the 115 meetings were distributed across 24  (80% of El Alto’s neighborhoods).   
Looking for patterns, Figure 11 shows another interesting fact about the decision 
to hold a meeting in a given place at a given time. Taking the overall period of strategy 
implementation, meetings do not seem motivated by public works in a given 
neighborhood: correlation between number of meetings and start of public works in a 
given neighborhood is 0.15. However, when only the Revocatoria period (Jan-Sept. 
2012) is considered, the correlation is up to 0.56.  
While this evidence is not conclusive, it indicates how the way neighborhood 
meetings were scaled up changed during the times of most political noise: the build up 
toward the Revocatoria vote of 2012, and at a lower extent before the Neighborhood 







Figure 11. Correlation between Start of Public Works projects in El Alto and 
Number of Neighborhood Meetings 
 
       Source: Author, based on Municipality of El Alto records. 
 
V.2.4 How the Mayor’s presence in meetings and the filing of meeting proceedings was 
decided  
Table 3 helps the discussion of implementation patterns for the two components 
for which an econometric analysis was possible. After controlling for neighborhood size, 
Mayor’s presence in meetings does not seem explained by either topics discussed or 
ongoing public works; in any case, results indicate that the mayor tends to avoid meetings 
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discussing representation issues. During the Revocatoria period, his presence is less 
likely if jobs, security or beautification are on the agenda91.  
The results bear a more detailed look at the implementation process. The first visit 
of the Mayor to a neighborhood meeting was only on July 2011, to Cabo Blanco. Even 
during the Revocatoria process (Jan.-Sept. 2012), the Mayor only attended 9 
neighborhood meetings; although 7 of those meetings occurred within two months of the 
vote. In fact, Mayor Zarate has attended 8% of meetings during his tenure, but 16% 
within two months of the Revocatoria vote. When inquired on this, the Manager of the 
Sub-Office of Neighborhood Participation stated that many Neighborhood Committees 
across the district requested during this time the presence of the Mayor to respond to 
allegations made by promoters of the revocation process.  
Comparing intended and realized strategies, the original plan of the Mayor of 
attending meetings at least once in each neighborhood per year proved to be unrealistic. 
This intervention, however, was instrumental from the political point of view for the 





                                                           
91 It may well be that neighborhood representatives were not interested in discussing upkeep when the 
Mayor was present, but it is highly unlikely that the discussion of jobs was not of interest when he visited. 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3 also takes a look at factors that increased the likelihood of filing meeting 
proceedings with the Municipality between May 2011 and October 2013.  Before the 
reform, it was common practice among Neighborhood Committees to keep Minutes of 
the topics discussed in each meeting, but not share these summaries with the 
Municipality. Facilitators, in addition, did not provided detail report on the meeting back 
to the Municipality.  
The filing of citizen requests posed during meetings was introduced in 2011 as 
part of the reform, but it was not systematically adopted or enforced: in 2011, only 2 out 
of 46 meetings filed their Minutes; in 2012, only 5 out of 115 meetings did so, and 
between January and October 2013, 9 out of 98 meetings did. Thus, this component of 
the strategy is an example of an intervention that suffered serious implementation 
shortcomings due to a focus in the form of the innovation instead of a clearer 
understanding of its function. 
The Sub-Office of Neighborhood Participation in coordination with the Municipal 
Manager, decided in November 2013 to declare mandatory for all facilitators and recently 
elected Neighborhood Committees to file the Minutes of each meeting with the 
Municipality for appropriate recording and follow up. In addition to this, a standard 
format for reporting was introduced so key information from the meeting could be 
highlighted.  
It is still early to see if this change will have any impact on outcomes. However, it 
is possible to have an idea of the incentives to file before it became mandatory, as this 
provides information on alignment of the different stakeholders with the strategy.  Table 
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3 results are just indicative: the available indicators are in fact not jointly significant in 
explaining filing, given the low variability in the value of the objective variable.  The 
only pattern observed is that the likelihood of filing increases when issues of 
representation are discussed in the meeting; which means that neighborhood leaders are 
more likely to file when their own role in the community is discussed.  
If appropriately enforced, making the filing of meeting proceedings, however, has 
the potential for significantly change the participatory dynamic in El Alto, as the 
Municipality now has a regular flow of information on demands and concerns of the 
citizens of El Alto, effectively turning an element of the strategy into a monitoring tool.  
V.2.5 Implementation of Neighborhood Committee election 
Before the participatory strategy was introduced, Neighborhood Committee 
representatives were elected every two years by show of hands at a special neighborhood. 
Mayor Zarate was eager to have an election monitored by the ONPE (National Office of 
Electoral Processes). The election was originally planned for mid-2012, but postponed 
due to the Revocatoria, so it only took place in September 2013.  
This intervention is different than the others in the strategy in the sense that it is a 
one-time event expected to take place every two years.  The intended outcome of this 
intervention was to improve the representativeness of leadership around the district, 
generating a sense of empowerment in citizens. There is, additionally, a political 
motivation behind it: weakening the family-based leadership system predominant at the 
neighborhood level.  
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It is not clear that the de-concentration of power was realized. Even though 
leadership did change in the largest neighborhood (El Volante), small neighborhoods are 
largely inhabited by members of the same extended family.  
V.2.6 Implementation Evaluation: General observations 
The review of the implementation of the different elements of the strategy reveals 
uneven but steady progress over time. It took the Sub-Office of Neighborhood 
Participation two years to have adequate resources and figure out the logistics to spread 
the organization of meetings across neighborhoods. Mayor’s presence in meetings was 
downsized compared to what was originally planned because it became clear that the 
original plan of visiting all neighborhoods every year was not realistic. Filing of 
neighborhood Minutes cannot even be considered as implemented until it became 
mandatory in November 2013. Finally, the Municipality officers interviewed note that the 
Neighborhood Committees’ election was only possible in large part because of the 
Mayor’s strengthened position after the Revocatoria process92, and it is unclear if it 
achieved its objectives.  
V.3 Theory of change and process mapping 
Figure 12 provides a synthesis of relevant information on the intended and 
realized participatory strategy of El Alto using the Context-Mechanism-Outcome 
hypothesis framework. It highlights the differences between the assumptions behind the 
original design and the mechanisms actually triggered. Any changes to the strategy to be 
suggested are to consider the informal and formal institutions surrounding the 
                                                           











participatory process in El Alto, as well as the behavior patterns of key players. The C-
M-O hypothesis also questions the immediate objectives of the strategy since they are not 
necessarily leading to fulfill the instrumental, intrinsic or constructive values of 
participation.   
Finally, the process map is reviewed to identify the challenges tackled by the 
current strategy components, and the missing elements of the strategy. Visualizing the 
strategy, it is clear that all interventions in El Alto have so far focused on expanding the 
demand side of governance, or in the analogy used, the wider end of the funnel, from the 
environment and actual collection of citizen concerns to the point those concerns and 
requests reach the Municipality, preventing information loss as much as possible. It is 
argued that additional measures need to be taken to guarantee the representation of 
vulnerable groups in terms of attendance to the meeting and actual participation during 
the meeting. Additionally, the process mapping highlights that measures are needed to 
adapt the response mechanisms of the Municipality so citizen feedback can be translated 









Figure 13. El Alto Participatory Strategy 
 
       Source: Author’s conceptualization.  
V.3.1 The strategy is incomplete  
The strategy has neglected the narrow end of the funnel, i.e. the handling of 
citizen requests and concerns once they reach the Municipality. As the literature review 
highlighted, success in participatory programs is typically linked to synergies between 
the demand side (citizens) and the supply sides of governance (local government).  
By improving the channeling of citizen demands, a larger flow of requests reaches 
the Municipality, and citizens are aware that their requests have been received by the 
authority. The Municipality, however, has not adapted its internal structure and 
organization to this increased flow of demands. The handling of citizen requests from 
neighborhood meetings is exactly the same as during the previous administration. 
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  The Sub-Office of Neighbor Participation (SPV) has very little leverage within 
the organizational structure of the Municipality: SPV passes along requests received 
from neighbors to the relevant municipal offices, but there remains no follow up or 
accountability system in place. 
If experience elsewhere is any indication, this lack of attention to the supply side 
will likely lead to a loss in credibility of the neighborhood meetings system (Fox, 2014). 
V.3.2 The strategy lacks adequate targeting 
However, the strategy is incomplete even in its demand-side focus. Increasing the 
number of meetings across neighborhoods improves the voice of residents living in 
smaller and normally less represented neighborhoods, but it is not clear that among those 
attending meetings or expressing their views are the poorest segments of the population. 
The strategy lacks instruments to specifically collect the voice of the poor, either because 
the announcement of the meeting does not reach them, or because even if they attend the 
meeting, they do not necessarily participate in the discussion.  
V.4 Supplementary interventions 
Based on the gaps found in the strategy and the performance of the existing 
components, the following are some concrete changes proposed to the Municipality of 
Alto for improving the strategy.  
V.4.1 At the wider end of the funnel: Improving participation 
The participatory planning stage aims at solving one of the biggest challenges of 
participatory development: representation of the views of the neighborhood as a whole 
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(i.e. correcting for bonding failures, responding to the asymmetry of power and realism 
challenges). 
There are two suggested interventions linked to this stage: 
a. Changes in format and dynamic of neighborhood meetings 
A pilot in which the thirty neighborhoods will be divided in two groups 
comparable groups in terms of size and social indicators. One group will organize 
business as usual neighborhood meetings while meetings for the second group will follow 
a different dynamic: a combination of timed discussions and opportunity during the 
meeting for explicitly requesting feedback from normally underrepresented or less vocal 
groups within the neighborhood. For both groups, every attendee fills a registry upon 
arrival to the meeting, requesting information on how each attendee learned about the 
meeting, and on issues they would like to discuss with the Municipality.  
Additionally, a box to collect suggestions and complaints will be kept at each 
meeting, and opinions systematized. Minutes of the meetings will be publicly displayed 
in municipal dependencies.  
Associated costs with this intervention are: special training on participatory 
planning for facilitators, additional personnel for the organization of meetings and the 
logistics they imply, and snacks and refreshments for participants93. Appendix 2 
describes how this change in the strategy implementation could be rigorously evaluated. 
 
                                                           
93 One of the explored options for additional personnel is to recruit volunteers from the local Technical 
School, with a recognition of their work through certificates and a small monetary compensation.  
154 
 
b. Changes in how neighborhood meetings are announced 
One of the big challenges of the strategy is to be able to generate decisions that 
are representative of the demands of each zone’s whole population. Since municipal 
budget does not allow for monetary compensation for neighbors’ time, meetings tend to 
be attended (and discussion monopolized) by a reduced number of social organizations 
and individuals.  
One alternative is changing the way the meetings are announced and promoted. 
Currently, it is ‘word of mouth’ or announced the same day of the meeting in the local 
street markets. An alternative is to pilot in a few neighborhoods an aggressive campaign 
to announce neighborhood meetings using flyers, door-to-door invitations, and timely 
announcements in community areas (for example, local market, convenience stores, and 
offices offering government services)  
V.4.2 At the narrow end of the funnel: processes within the Municipality 
The Municipality of El Alto has vowed to change its processes towards improved 
coordination and information exchange between its offices. Changes within the structure 
of the Municipality are not easy to achieve or sustain, since the incentives tilt towards the 
focus on infrastructure programs. 
The recommendation is to track what happens after the Sub-Office of Neighborhood 
Participation reports the results of the participatory planning process (including the 
priorities established by citizens under the new meeting dynamic proposed) to the 
Municipal Council. Resolutions from the Municipality and City Orders (Ordenanzas) to 
the lists produced by participatory meetings could be compared for future evaluation.  
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VI. Conclusions: El Alto Participatory Strategy 
Following the recommendation of Mansuri and Rao (2011a), this evaluation has 
been heavy in contextually sensitive diagnosis, understanding the relationship between 
citizens, local government and other players relevant to the participatory process. The 
case of El Alto, in fact, reflects many of the characteristics of programs studied by them 
that were not successful in improving service delivery and empowerment.  
For starters, by limiting the objective of the strategy to citizen attendance to 
meetings (not even actual participation during the meeting) El Alto’s strategy assumes 
that attendance is enough guarantee of effective service delivery (one that responds to 
citizen needs and promotes downward accountability. This view crucially overlooks: a) 
that bonding failures of civil society such as elite capture can still happen during the 
meetings, with interest groups dominating the agenda and the decision-making process; 
and b) that the quality of deliberation (across the dimensions of breadth, range, depth and 
control) determines the effectiveness of the meetings as tools. Thus, the current objective 
indicators do not say much about citizen empowerment (the goal used to justify the 
strategy), and do not guarantee the underlying goal of political stability either.  
There is however a perception among Municipal officials that the interventions 
have been instrumental in generating political stability during the Revocatoria process. 
Thus, meetings have been prioritized in neighborhoods with ongoing public works in 
certain periods of time; and Mayor Zarate increased his presence in meetings during the 
campaign to remove him from office. Even if it is the case that the strategy helped the 
Mayor to keep his job, such an effect rests on the credibility that the neighborhood 
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meeting system has among citizens. At this point, no element of the strategy is trying to 
preserve or increase the credibility of the participatory system. 
The theoretical framework suggests that credibility is sustained in effectiveness: 
the existence of response mechanisms as part of a strategic (Fox, 2014) or ‘sandwich’ 
approach (Mansuri and Rao, 2011b) to participation, so citizens know that the local 
government does takes their feedback into consideration. 
Moreover, the strategy as it stands today lacks any attempt to improve the 
Municipality’s management of citizen requests. Even if achieving the instrumental value 
of participation (improving service delivery) was not set as a short term goal for El 
Alto’s strategy, it may well be the element that guarantees its sustainability by 
strengthening citizen credibility in the system. Presently, however, all planning done by 
the Municipality is circumscribed to public works (decided or not through a participatory 
budgeting process of limited-deliberation), and very little attention is given to the 
feedback provided by citizens in neighborhood meetings. The existence of other channels 
for local leadership to channel assistance to their neighborhood, such as meetings 
between neighborhood leaders and oil companies, weakens even more the local 
government’s position.  
The evaluation team left in place a managerial and monitoring tool for the 
collection of information from meetings based on the mandatory filing of meeting 
proceedings and the systematization of past information. It also left a strategy design and 
evaluation plan based on the process mapping and identification of gaps in the strategy. 
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The application of this plan will allow the regular collection of information 
related to the quality of participation, and the piloting of mechanisms in neighborhood 
meetings to elicit the opinions and ideas of people that attend but do not participate. 
Suggestions to improve the announcement of the meetings in the community and to 
gather citizen requests and concerns beyond the meetings and Mesa de Partes, are being 
explored. 
The case of El Alto reflects a common view that urban Municipalities of Peru 
have of participation: the more people present at meetings, the more legitimacy the 
participatory process has. However, there is no accountability in terms of answering to 
citizens, and no monitoring of how representative the views expressed during the 
meetings are of the community. The selection of attendance as main outcome indicator 
mirrors the limited ambition of the strategy. Short term gains in attendance and youth 
attendance registered in El Alto mask the underlying limitations of the strategy.  
The analysis recommends complementing the evaluation of objectives with the 
evaluation of implementation and benchmarking under a strategy evaluation. Such an 
approach better identifies limitations and weaknesses in the strategy in an environment of 
information shortage and changing political environment and creates a strong argument 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2  
An evaluation framework for the revamped participatory strategy 
The new evaluation would measure how much neighborhood preferences are 
matched by the topics discussed in the participatory meetings, the decisions taken by 
those meetings, and the policies adopted by the Municipal Council and the different 
municipal managers. To this end, two variables at the individual level (each expressed 
demand collected before the meetings) are constructed, following Ban and Rao (2009): a 
matched-decision dummy (DD), and a decision intensity (DI). The matched-decision 
indicates if the issue of interest of each individual is reflected in the meetings minutes, 
while the decision intensity tracks how important was the issue during the discussion. 
Given a set of issues (I) treated during meetings in zone z, and each issue ikz taking a 
fraction fkz of the discussion, the matched-decision dummy is defined as: 
                                                               1 if  id e Iz          
                                                DD=  
                                                               0  otherwise 
While decision intensity  
                                                               fdz   if  id e Iz          
                                                DI=  
                                                               0  otherwise 
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Given the more deliberative meetings (Meeting), and the reorganization of 
Municipal administration (Reform) proposed, together the effect of the participatory 
strategy on the match of demands to decisions taken by the Municipality is represented 
by two equations to be estimated: 
DDdz=  α + β1 * Meeting + β2 * Reform + β3 * Zone + β4 * Source + e  
DIdz=  α + β1 * Meeting + β2 * Reform + β3 * Zone + β4 * Source + e 
Where Meeting is a dummy indicating if the matched demand was collected in a 
zone exposed to the intervention; Reform is 1 if the Municipal Office that receives the 
demand from the Sub-Office of Neighborhood Participation does participate of the 
realignment and coordination process (i.e. , if it produces a formal response to the 
requested received)94; Zone is a vector of median characteristics of the zone where the 
demand was collected, and Source indicates if the demand was expressed from an 
individual neighbor, or by a representative from a social organization.. 
Using the assumption of sequential ignorability (Imai et al, 2011), it is possible to 
estimate the total average treatment of a change in meeting dynamics, and the average 
causal mediation effect (ACME) of mechanisms aimed at reflecting views of people non-
attending meetings, and of prevalent processes within the Municipality. 
This specification is for the overall participatory strategy, but it can be broken 
down to first evaluate the match of demands with issues discussed at the meeting:  
DDMeetingdz=  α + β1 Meeting + β2 * Zone + β3 * Source + e  
                                                           
94 This will control for the type of demand expressed (infrastructure, citizen safety, sanitation, etc.). Alternatively, it 




DIMeetingdz=  α + α + β1 Meeting + β2 * Zone + β3 * Source + e  
And also, to compare the decisions taken at the meeting, to the issues discussed at 
the Municipal Council, or directly executed by the different Municipal Offices (Stage 2): 
DDPolicydz=  α + β1 * Meeting + β2 * Reform + β5 * Budget + β6 * Source + e  
DIPolicydz=  α + β1 * Meeting + β2 * Reform + β5 * Budget + β6 * Source + e 
Where Budget indicates the relative size of the issue demanded in the municipal 
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